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Comment

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS CONTROVERSY:
THE REARDON REPORT CONSIDERED
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental liberties
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. They must be zealously preserved, but at the same time must be exercised with an
awareness of the potential impact of public statements on other
fundamental rights, including the right of a person accused of
crime, and of his accusers, to a fair trial by an impartial jury.1

INTRODUCTION
The approved draft of StandardsRelating to FairTrial and Free
Press,2 generally referred to as the Reardon Report, is the organized
bar's response to the necessity for guaranteeing a fair trial while
still allowing as much publicity as is possible.
The standards promulgated are merely recommendations which
the eleven member drafting committee has proposed for adoption
by the appropriate authorities in the various jurisdictions. 3 If not
so adopted they will in no way affect the particular jurisdiction.
However, having the prestige of the ABA House of Delegates
behind it, the Reardon Report bears analysis as its recommendations

1 AnvisoRY COBIMiTTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE

PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON

M1VmrIvum STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSITcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
FAIR TRIAL Am FREE PRESs-TENTATIVE DRAFT AT 16 (1966) [hereinafter

cited as REARDON REPORT-TENTATIVE DRAFT].
2 ADvisoRY CoMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON
MINIVIUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS-APPRVED DRAFT (1968) [hereinafter cited
as REARDON REPORT]. The full text of the recommended standards as
approved by the ABA House of Delegates is set out in an appendix
to this Comment.
s In addition to the Reardon Report, the most noteable proposals of
standards in this area have come from the Co1mT
oN THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEMT, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT OF THE COvmITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON

THE 'REE

PREss-FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE

(Sept. 1968)

[hereinafter cited

as the KAUFmAN REPORT] and THE SPECIAL COMIITTEE ON RADIO,
TELESmION, Am THE ADmNISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE ASSocIATIoN
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YOREK (1967)

MEDINA REPORT].

[hereinafter cited as the
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will be carefully considered by local bar associations, judges, and
4
legislatures.

This Comment presents a critical analysis of the recommendations of the Reardon Report. An attempt will be made to evaluate
the recommendations with particular emphasis on whether they
have struck a fair and constitutionally permissible balance between
the constitutional guarantees of fair trial and free speech.5
PART I. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL CASES
Part I of the Reardon Report recommends sweeping changes in
Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon 20 was
adopted by the American Bar Association on August 27, 1908, and
has continued without change until the present.6 The Committee
on Professional Ethics has construed Canon 20 as meaning that:
"Statements relating to prospective or pending criminal or civil
4

The Canons of Ethics have been adopted, in one form or another, in
nearly all jurisdictions by one of these three groups. See generally

G. BRAND, BAR ASSOCIATIONS, ATTORNEYs AND JUDGES: ORGANIZATION,
ETHIcs, DISCIPLINE (1956) [hereinafter cited as BRAND].
5 The Committee has framed the problem thusly: "(1) In what ways
may the reporting of criminal matters endanger the proper functioning
of the criminal process and, in particular, jeopardize the right of the
accused and his accusers to a fair and impartial trial? (2) To the
extent that such dangers appear to exist, can steps be taken which
will reduce or eliminate them without curtailing the benefits to be
obtained from informing the public and without in any way abridging freedom of speech and of the press? These questions necessitate
evaluation of the problem both in terms of the magnitude and in
terms of the specific kinds of public statements that appear to create
the greatest hazards." REAmoN REPORT-TENTATIVE DRAFT at 20-21.
6 Canon 20 provides: "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the
Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of
a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional

to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not
go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court;
but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement."
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 20. See BRAND for a listing

of adoption of Canons by states. Disciplinary rule 7-107 of Canon 7
of the proposed Code of Professional Responsibility incorporates the
fair trial-free press standards which the Reardon Report applies to
lawyers. ABA SPECIAL COUTTEE
ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 89-91. (Preliminary Draft
Jan. 15, 1969). The United States District Courts of New Jersey and
of the Southern District of New York have also adopted the ethical
guidelines which the Reardon Report sets out for lawyers. D.N.J. R. 36;
D.S.D.N.Y. R. 8.
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proceedings, while not prohibited, should avoid any statement of
fact likely to create an adverse public attitude respecting the
alleged actions of the defendants to such proceedings. ' 7 Due to the
generality of terms in which Canon 20 is couched and the indulgence
of local bar committees and courts, there has been little effective
enforcement of the Canon.8 The result is that the practitioner is
left with wide latitude in the dissemination of information in an
area where only "guarded" statements can be safely made.
Canon 20 might be adequate in preventing extrajudicial statements if it were enforced.9 However, the continued violations of
the spirit, if not the letter, of Canon 20 which have gone unpunished
indicate that a revision is necessary to give impetus to the prevention of dissemination of extrajudicial information by attorneys in
criminal cases.' o
Either through enforcement of Canon 20 or through the adoption
and enforcement of a more detailed canon such as that proposed by
the Reardon Report it should be clearly and forcefully emphasized
by the Bar and the courts that the primary duty of both prosecution
and defense attorneys is to do justice; justice within the courts
and not through the release of extrajudicial information." The
organized bar must set the example before rising to condemn others.
The recommendations governing informational releases by
lawyers cover the criminal process from the time when litigation
is pending or imminent to the time when trial is concluded or there
is disposition without trial. The primary emphasis is placed on
the period from the time of arrest or the filing of formal charges
to the beginning of the trial or disposition without trial The
7 ABA Comm. ON PRoFEssIoNAL EThics, OPINIONs, No. 199 (1940).
8 MEIbNA RFPORT at 17; H. DRINKR, LEGAL ETHIcs 70 (1953). But cf.

State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 34-35, 139 N.W.2d 490, 514 (1966);
State v. Van Dyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965).
9 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); State v. Thompson,
273 Minn. 1, 34-35, 139 N.W.2d 490, 514 (1966); State v. Van Dyne, 43
N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965).
See also State ex rel. Nebraska Bar Assn. v. Nielsen, 179 Neb. 55, 136
N.W.2d 355 (1965), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 383 U.S.
105

(1966).

10 The Reardon Report, and hence this Comment, is limited in scope

and involves only criminal litigation; however, the authors of this
Comment feel that many' of the arguments posited would apply with
equal force to civil litigation.
11 See Canon 5, which provides in part that: "The primary duty of a
lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see
that justice is done." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSioNAL ETmcs No. 5.
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rationale behind allowing different types of information to be
released at different time periods is to allow divulgence
of the
12
most information consonant with fair trial safeguards.
1.1 REVSION

OF THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETMICS.

The first paragraph of section 1.1 merely states the broad
principles underlying the specific restrictions which follow and,
even in its general terms, is as specific as the present Canon 20.
The second paragraph deals with the investigatory period prior
to the filing of formal charges or the making of an arrest and is
the first of the relevant time periods considered in the recommendations. During this period the attorney is prohibited from making
any extrajudicial statements which are not a matter of public
record; however, this is not meant to prevent a district attorney
from releasing information that would help in the apprehension
of the suspect or to warn the public of dangers. 3
Hopefully, the attorneys involved would not be guided by the
strict letter of the second paragraph but would also be guided by
the principles enunciated in the first paragraph, whereby they
would use prudence and discretion in the dissemination of news
matter. Furthermore, they will then be guided by the "reasonable

likelihood" standard as set forth in the first paragraph. It cannot
be overemphasized that in many cases, statements made to the
news media concerning the crime itself, as distinct from the accused,
can play an equally prejudicial role.
From the time of arrest or filing of formal charges, attorneys
associated with the case are not allowed to release to the press
certain specified information. Prior criminal records, 14 confessions
or the lack thereof, performance on, or refusal to take examinations,
information concerning witnesses, the possibility of a guilty plea,
and any opinions as to the merits of the case or as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused 15 are all in the excluded class. Allowed is
information relating to the name, family status, and occupation of
the accused.
12

In attempting to guarantee a fair trial there must still be the greatest
release of information that is possible under the circumstances. Naturally the public is interested in the apprehension of fugitives and
in learning the circumstances surrounding crimes. Furthermore, there
are benefits to be derived from the public having knowledge of the
functioning of the judicial process.

13 REARDON REPORT-TENTATIVE DRAFT at 85.

14 E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1961).
15 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966).
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For the most part the releasable information vis-&-vis the
accused is well thought out in that only information which would
seldom be prejudicial is releasable. The distinction to be made is
whether the releasable information is of an informational character
or whether it goes to the merits of the case. If it goes to the
merits it is not to be released. However, there remains the possibility that releases of an informational character which do not go
to the merits of the case will be so used by the news media as to
prejudice the minds of potential jurors. An example of this might
occur concerning information relating to the arrest or pursuit of
the accused. In this age of fear of the police by certain socioeconomic classes, the minds of some prospective jurors might well
be prejudiced by an unwillingness of the accused to surrender himself. This type of situation clearly calls for guarded informational
releases.
One further comment is relevant at this time. The Attorney
General, by administrative order, has said that the employees of
the Justice Department may give out information concerning the
past federal criminal convictions of the accused.' 6 If the Supreme
Court, in exercise of its rule making power over the federal courts,
or if an individual federal court adopted the guidelines of the
Reardon Report this order would be superseded as the latter
guidelines are more restrictive than the former 1 7 In any case,
with the admission as evidence of past criminal convictions being
of dubious validity, 8 it is questionable whether the Attorney
General's order is wise as it is in contraposition to the clear policy
of law. The evidence of past convictions not generally being
allowed at trial, if this same information were to be released to the
public, the rules of evidence and the desirable end of a fair trial
may well be subverted.' 9
The Reardon Report recommends that a description of physical
evidence seized, other than a confession, admission or statement,
be releasable to the news media by the attorneys. As some of the
evidence may not be admissable, there is no reason to allow its
potentially prejudicial effects without first testing its admissibility
in court.2 0 This standard gives the prosecuting attorney an opportunity for abuse which is not warranted in light of the strictures
put on the principals involved by the rest of the Reardon Report.
16 28 C.F.R. § 50.2.
17 As to recently proposed standards for the federal courts, see KAuaAN
REPORT.
18

Annot., 170 A.L.R. 306 (1947).

19 C. McComancx, HDBOOK or TnE LAW OF EmVENcE § 157 (1954).

20 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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The next two paragraphs in section 1.1 have the desirable effect
of making the attorneys try the case in court. The first prohibits
all extrajudicial statements during the trial with the sole exception
that a lawyer may quote from, or refer without comment to, the
public records of the court in the case. The second prohibits the
dissemination of extrajudicial statements that might have a reasonable likelihood of affecting the judgment or sentence after completion of the trial but before final determination of the outcome.
This is to prevent a public appeal for a heavy or light sentence in
the hope of influencing a judge's decision.21 The judge is, from the
standpoint of jurisprudential theory, an unbiased functionary;
nevertheless, many judges stand for election and therefore could
be subject to the sentiment of the community or the news media, the
support of whom would be needed for re-election.
The last paragraph in this section concedes that stricter rules
may be necessary in juvenile proceedings or that a relaxation may
be necessary in the case of legislative hearings. It also allows an
attorney to answer charges of misconduct publicly made against
him. As these provisions will, to a large extent, be governed by
local statute and do not concern the adult criminal offender, they
will not be evaluated here.
1.2

RULE OF COURT.

The Reardon Report in this section states that "(i) n any jurisdiction in which Canons of Professional Ethics have not been
adopted by statute or court rule, it is recommended that the substance of the foregoing section be adopted as a rule of court
governing the conduct of attorneys. '22 Three possible situations
exist in regard to the adoption of a new canon: (1) The legislature
under its police power has adopted the present Canons as rules for
the attorneys of the jurisdiction. (2) The court has adopted the
Canons as rules of conduct for its court officer-attorneys. (3) The
Canons of Ethics have not been officially adopted.
Where the court has adopted the Canons as part of its own
rules, there is little difficulty in changing the rules of practice 23
as long as the rules are reasonable.2 Analogously, where the Canons
have not been adopted they could be adopted as a rule of practice in
the courts of the jurisdiction.
21 REARDON REPORT-TENTATIVE DRAFT
22 REA ON REPORT § 1.2.
23 20 AM. JuR. Courts §§ 82-84.
24

at 93.

E.g., Byers v. Smith, 4 Cal. 2d 209, 213, 47 P.2d 705, 707 (1935); People
v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934).

COIMENTS
The greatest difficulty lies where the legislature has adopted
the Canons by statute. If the legislature were not disposed to adopt
the new Canon (and this is a distinct possibility in light of news
media sentiment against the recommendations) two possible lines
of argument could obtain.
The specific recommendations of the proposed Canon 20 could
be considered by the court to be merely an implementation of the
broad requirements of the present Canon. Using this viewpoint
there would be no judicial usurpation of legislative perogative but
rather an explication of what the legislature commanded. Other
courts might take the view that legislation could never usurp the
inherent judicial power to adopt rules of practice regulating the
conduct of attorneys. On the other hand, some courts would
undoubtedly consider that they have "no power to adopt and
enforce any rule of practice . . .where there is a valid statute
completely regulating the same subject .... -25 Thus, an important
part of the recommendations would not be put into effect.

1.3 ENFORCEMENT.
To the extent that section 1.3 recommends that violation of the
proposed canon be grounds for disciplinary proceedings which
may be initiated by an attorney, a bar association, or a court, it
does not vary from the procedures generally in force at present in
most jurisdictions. 26 However, the tentative draft of the Reardon
Report also allowed punishment by contempt for violation of the
proposed canon.27 This was deleted from the final draft because the
Committee felt that the difference between jurisdictions as to the
availability of the contempt power in this type of case and the
adequacy of disciplinary proceedings made it unnecessary. 28 Nevertheless, the Committee does recommend its use where available and
when the circumstances warrant. 29
The general commentary accompanying the Tentative Draft
endorsed the practice of requiring that the judge issuing a contempt
citation not preside over the contempt proceedings.30 This recommendation pertained only to contempt citations and was therefore
not included in the approved draft. The underlying policy con25 In re Petition of

61 (1940)

Fla. State Bar Ass'n., 145 Fla. 223, 232, 199 So. 57,

(concurring opinion).

26 See BRAuw for a listing of disciplinary
27 REARDON REPORT-TENTATIVE DRAFT at
28 REARDoN REPORT at 21.
29 Id.

30 REA

methods by state.
95.

oN REPORT-TENTAuvE DAFT at 97.
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siderations militate toward the view that any disciplinary action
taken under the recommendations be treated in a like manner.
There is no sound reason why the judge, to whose court the offense
was committed, should be allowed to preside at a case where he is
effectively a party in interest. Furthermore, procedural due process
questions might arise in light of recent Supreme Court decisions
which construe the fifth amendment as extending to attorneys.3 1
The extension of other constitutional guarantees to attorneys,
in
32
light of the language of the court, would seem concomitant.
The inherent power of a judge to both initiate proceedings and
to summarily punish for a contempt committed in the presence33
of the court becomes quite limited once outside the courtroom.
Even more limited would be the power of either the court or bar
34
to initiate and sit in judgment of other disciplinary proceedings.
Failure to provide procedural due process safeguards is a serious
error in light of the tensions that might well build up during an
extended criminal trial.
PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, JUDGES, AND
JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES IN CRIMINAL CASES
2.1

DEPARimmTTAL RULES.

Section 2.1 of the Reardon Report underwent major revisions
before reissuance and approval. The most important change is that
the Tentative Draft flatly recommended that informational disclosures by law enforcement agencies be governed by rule of court,
whereas the Approved Draft recommends that essentially the same
regulations be adopted internally by the law enforcement agencies
in each jurisdiction. The Committee gave as the main reason for
the change that increased recognition of the problem called for
an opportunity for self-regulation by law enforcement agencies
before restrictions were imposed externally.
The desired result, i.e., adoption of internal regulations by law
enforcement agencies, is not as easily attained as the Committee
might wish. The adoption of regulations governing conduct, discipline, and removal of law enforcement officers is usually provided
31 See In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
32 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 514 (1967).
33 See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517
34

(1925); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d

600 (1959).
In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 596-98, 172 A.2d 835, 840-41 (1961);
See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
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for by constitutional, statutory, or charter provisions.35 A fortiri,
only persons or agencies with the authorized power may adopt
the regulations and discipline or effect the removal of a law
enforcement officer for violation of the regulations.
Ordinarily, in the absence of constitutional limitations, law
enforcement agencies at various governmental levels are subject
to legislative control,8 6 and no city charter provision may conflict
with state legislation. 7 The legislature could therefore adopt or
prohibit regulations such as proposed by the Reardon Report and
make the mandate binding on all law enforcement agencies within
the state.
Constitutional arguments as to a law enforcement officer's right
to freedom of speech are readily answered. Restrictions may be
imposed by the hiring body or other authorized governmental body.
The authorized body has power to regulate within reasonable limits
the conduct of employees in order to promote efficiency and integrity
in the public service.38 It cannot be questioned that informational
releases by law enforcement officers which might impede a fair
trial would also tend to hinder the efficiency and impugn the
integrity of the public service and are thus properly controllable.
The well settled rule was stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in
McAuliffe v. New Bedford:3 9
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does
not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as
well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms
which are offered him. On this same principle the... [appropriate
governing authority] . . . may impose any reasonable condition upon
holding offices within its control. 40
It must be kept in mind, however, that this right to proscribe
certain constitutional freedoms arises from the employer-employee
relationship and is not generally a power that can be exercised
apart from this contractual relationship.
E.g., Royal v. Ecorse Police & Fire Comm., 345 Mich. 214, 217, 75
N.W.2d 841, 842-43 (1956); Huhnke v. Wischer, 271 Wis. 66, 69-70,
72 N.W.2d 915, 917 (1955).
86 See Arnett v. State ex rel. Donohue, 168 Ind. 180, 80 N.E. 153 (1907);
State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944);
State ex rel. City of untington v. Lombardo, 149 W. Va. 671, 143
S.E.2d 535 (1965).
37 2 E. YoKLEY, MuimciPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 363 (1957 and 1968 supp.).
38 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
39 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
40 Id. at 220, 29 N.E. 517-18. See also 2 E. Yo=Y, MuNicnPAL CORPORATIONS § 343 (1957 and 1968 supp.).
35
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The subject has also been considered by the Supreme Court in
United Public Workers v. Mitchell41 wherein it was said: "The
essential rights of the First Amendment in some instances are
subject to the elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others would be a mockery. '42 The Court
continued by saying that: "When the actions of civil servants
in the judgment of Congress menace the integrity and the competency of the service, legislation to forestall such danger and
adequate to maintain its usefulness is required. ' 43 The conclusion
is unmistakable. If the appropriate legislative body should adopt
these recommendations, the restrictions placed upon the law enforcement officers would be valid.
At this point an analysis focusing on the adequacy of the internal
regulations proposed by the Reardon Report is in order. The focal
point of any discussion in this area is that of guaranteeing the
accused the right to a fair trial.
Subsection (a) is concerned with informational releases during
the period of investigation and prior to the making of an arrest
or the filing of formal charges. Except in the case where additional
releases are necessary to aid the investigation, assist in apprehension
of the suspect, or to warn the public of danger, this subsection
allows releases only of "pertinent facts" relating to the crime itself
and to the investigative procedures used. To this extent it is
similar to the restraints imposed upon attorneys by the proposed
Canon 20. Results of investigative procedures, as well as the identity
of the suspect before arrest are set forth as not releasable unless
made necessary by one of the above exceptions.
The proposals are adequate except that the term "pertinent
facts" may lend itself to varying interpretations as to its meaning.
The Reardon Report itself gives no indicia of relevancy. What is
probably meant by the term is found in the first part of the
Reardon Report, under proposed Canon 20 where a pertinent fact
is defined as one necessary to inform the public of the nature of the
crime that has occurred and of the general scope of the investigation
that is underway.
A useful comparison can be made by examining the Medina
Report in regard to specification of releasable information. The
Medina Report sets forth specifically that "[g]ruesome or sordid
aspects which tend unduly to inflame public emotions shall not be
41
42

43

330 U.S. 75 (1947).
Id. at 95.
Id. at 103.
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released."4 4 This recommendation is a good one, for information of
this tenor may prejudice a potential juror more readily than would
a simple description of the occurrence and nature of the crime.
Furthermore, the position cannot be taken that gruesome or sordid
details are ever pertinent. A similar recommendation in the Reardon
Report would have been useful. At the very least, the term "pertinent facts" should be construed as preventing release of this type of
information.
The major shortcoming of the Reardon Report in this section
is the statement that "[t]his regulation should establish appropriate
procedures for the release of information. '45 In the commentary
accompanying the Tentative Draft the Committee states the purpose
of this provision is to "prevent the improper release of information
on an ad hoc basis by individual law enforcement officers." 46 No
guidelines are ordained, however. The Medina Report sets up
guidelines 47 which the Reardon Report would have done well to
adopt. These guidelines call for the establishment of an information officer who is to be responsible for the dissemination of all
information to the news media. This type of recommendation is
preferable for it is more definite than that of the Reardon Report
and would prevent the news media from piecing together a story
from several different sources.
Subsection (b) prohibits deliberate posing of a person for
photographing by the news media and also prohibits interviews
of the accused, while in custody, unless he consents, in writing, to
an interview and is informed of his right to counsel. The requirements of this subsection meet due process safeguards in requiring
both consent and knowledge of the right to counsel.48 The advice
of counsel could be particularly helpful in preventing the accused
from prejudicing his own case through indiscreet informational
releases. 49 The Medina Report does not permit the defendant to
be interviewed under any circumstances.5 0 The Reardon Report
proposes the better solution in this area as the advice of counsel
44 MEDINA REPORT at
45 REARmON REPORT §

33.

2.1 (a).
46 REAwoN REPORT--TENTATVE DRAFT

48
49

50

at 109.

at 34-35.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The advice of counsel seems important in this regard as the argument
can be made that, if the accused should release information prejudicial to a fair trial, he has waived his right and is barred from
seeking judicial relief as to any information actually released or any
inferences drawn therefrom.
MEDINA REPORT at 33.

47 MfEDINA REPORT
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would give the accused protection without going to the extreme
of completely closing off his access to the public.5'
Subsection (c) sets out the same requirements as did the
proposed Canon of Ethics. 52 Needless to say, the same comments
5 3
apply with equal force to this section as to the former section.
Subsection (d) recommends adoption of a regulation imposing
disciplinary sanctions for violation of departmental rules governing informational releases. This presents no problem. The appropriate officers, pursuant to the applicable departmental and governmental rules, would
have the power to discipline subordinates
54
for misconduct.

2.2 RULE OF COURT

OR LEGISLATION RELATING TO LAW

ENFORCEMENT

AGENCIES.

Section 2.2 of the Reardon Report recommends that if the substance of the report is not adopted within a reasonable time by the
law enforcement agency of a jurisdiction, then it should be adopted
either by rule of court or legislative fiat, with appropriate sanctions
for violation. The ability of the legislature to adopt this type of
recommendation has been dealt with previously 55 and only the
power of the court to issue rules and the constitutionality of the
rules, respecting the release of information by law enforcement
officers, will be considered at this point.
The Committee glossed over the jurisdictional and constitutional
problems inherent in a court rule of the type recommended. 6 In
connection with the jurisdictional question, the Committee argues
that the separation of powers under the state and federal forms of
government does not limit a court's power to impose restrictions
upon the executive branch; that is, the law enforcement agencies
in this case. The viewpoint is that the proposed restrictions fall
within the area of overlap and concurrent authority that exists
between the different branches of government. In support of this
view the Committee points to Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 57 as promulgated by the Supreme Court, which
51

See Hillerman, The Budville Murders: Reardon Rules in Action, Vol.
56, THE QUILL

at 12 (Oct.

1968).

52 RARDON REPORT § 1.1.
OSee discussion of section 1.1, supra 1048.
54 See 2 E. YOKLEY, MuicIPAL CoRPoRATioNs

1968

§§ 343, 363 (1957 and

supp.).

55 See discussion of section 2.1, supra 1052.
56 Compare REARDON REPORT-TENTATIVE DRAFT at 99-104 with REARDON
REPORT at 24.
57 FED. R. Camn. P. 5 (a).
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provides for prompt arraignment of arrested persons. The Committee is correct in stating that this is a judicial command directed
at the conduct of law enforcement officers but it is also important to
note that here the command is made to ensure the accused his
constitutional rights and does not infringe upon any constitutional
right of the law enforcement officer. In the situation at hand the
accused's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury
must be balanced against the law enforcement officer's right to
freedom of speech.
The Committee also refers to Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v.
State"" in which the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed a contempt citation as an abridgment of the freedom of speech. In doing
so, the court stated that it was not suggesting that the courts lack
the power to discipline officials who are part of the administration
of justice. This statement, as well as the fact that the court reached
the decision without having to pass upon the validity of a court
rule prohibiting issuance by police authorities of statements bearing
upon issues to be tried, is looked to by the Committee as support of
its position that the court has authority to issue such orders.
However, the Supreme Court of Maryland did not define whom it
considered as officials concerned with the administration of justice,
nor did it decide the validity of the rule. It also failed to say
whether, if discipline of the officials was to be allowed, it should
be on the basis of a violation of the court rule or on the basis of an
abuse of the freedom of speech apart from the court rule. From
the foregoing it is extremely difficult to obtain any support for
the Committee's position.
Finally, in support of the court's power to issue this type of
order, the cases of Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas59 and
Seymour v. United States60 are cited as authority. Each is distinguishable from the problem presented by the recommendation
of the Reardon Report because the court orders involved prohibited
the taking of pictures in and around the courthouse during the trial
period. In neither case were the federal appellate courts required
to rule on the authority or constitutionality of a court order regulating law enforcement activity away from the courthouse. It is
concededly within the power of the judge to control activity in and
around the courthouse to ensure the dignity and decorum of the
61

court.

58
59
60
61

193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).

373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
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In concluding that a court has jurisdiction to issue an order
of this type the Committee overlooked several recent landmark
cases. State v. Van Duyne 2 involved a first degree murder conviction that was sustained even though some jurors had read pretrial
newspaper stories referring to the crime with which the defendant
was charged. The court recognized that much of the inflammatory
factual material was furnished to the newspapers by the police
and commented that such conduct was censurable and worthy of
discipline. The court continued:
With respect to ... members of local police... statements of the
type described are an improper interference with the due administration of criminal justice and constitute conduct unbecoming
a police officer. As such they warrant discipline at the hands of
the proper authorities.63
A Minnesota case with a similar fact situation, State v. Thompson,,4
extended the Van Duyne doctrine by saying:
Police officers, over whom we have no such disciplinary power,
ought likewise to be dealt with by their superior officers to the
end that criminal cases may be fairly tried in court and not in
the news media.6 5
In reaching this conclusion both courts have recognized the difficulty of striking a fair balance between first and sixth amendment
rights. In neither case were the courts disposed to recognize the
authority of the courts to issue orders governing informational
releases by police officers. In Sheppard v. Maxwell 66 the Supreme
Court said that "the court should have made some effort to control
the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by the
police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both sides.' '67 Continuing the Court stated:
More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official
which divulged prejudicial matters .... Being advised of the great
public interest in the case, the mass coverage of the press, and the
potential prejudicial impact of publicity, the court could also
have requested the appropriate city and county officials to promulgate a regulation with respect to68 dissemination of information
about the case by their employees.

43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1964).
Id. at 389, 204 A.2d at 852.
64273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966).
62
63

65 Id. at 35, 139 N.W.2d at 514.
66 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
67 Id. at 359.

68 Id. at 361-62 (emphasis added).
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There clearly appears to be a differentiation by the courts of the
persons over whom they do have authority and over whom they do
not. With law enforcement officers the courts recommend control
over informational releases be exercised by the appropriate officials
whereas the courts recommend proscription by court rule as to the
parties under their control.
Another state case in point is County of Los AngeZes v. Superior
Court.69 Here an injunction prohibiting statements by the police
during the prearraignment period was held to be in excess of the
court's jurisdiction. The court expressly said it was not deciding
the issue of whether such an injunction
might be issued after an
70
accusatory pleading had been filed.

The Medina Report also questions the authority of courts to
71
issue such an order for any time period during the judicial process.
Although recognizing it may exist during judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings the Medina Report does not recognize the power during
the pretrial stages of the criminal process. If this is so, the recommendations of the Reardon Report in this regard will have lost most
of their effectiveness because the pretrial period is when law
enforcement officers make most informational releases. The authors
of the Kaufman Report, in their recommendations to the Chief
Justice and members of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
69 253 Cal App. 2d 670, 62 Cal Rptr. 435 (1967).
70 The case was decided on the narrow grounds that the respondent
court did not have the jurisdiction to issue a permanent court order
governing the release of information during the prearraignment period.
It is interesting to note that this same respondent court has enacted
essentially the same court order, following the guidelines of the
Reardon Report, in the Sirhan B. Sirhan. case. The order in the Sirhan
case governs informational releases from the period of indictment
until the matter is disposed of and relates only to the Sirhan case.
The opening paragraph of the court order follows. "The Grand Jury
having returned an indictment in this matter on this date, June 7,
1968, this Court now has jurisdiction over all the proceedings in this
case for the first time. Therefore, the Court is now in a legal position
to make certain orders respecting this matter." People v. Sirhan, No.
233421 (Super. Ct. of the State of Calif. for the County of Los Angeles,
June 7, 1968).
71 The authors of the Medina Report stated that: "[T]he courts lack
any power whatsoever over the police or the news media during
the first stage of the pretrial period, except the ever-present power
to control activities in and around the courthouse .... Moreover, we
think that such proceedings and the court rules, legislation or what
not else authorizing such contempt proceedings might well be held
to be a violation of the First Amendment guarantees of free press and
free speech. Furthermore, as to the police, we find no authority
inherent in the courts or the judges to discipline them for alleged
breach of their duties as police officers." VIEDiNA REPORT at 40.
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do not recommend any judicially imposed restrictions upon the
release of information by federal law enforcement officers. In doing
so they note that the Sheppard decision was phrased as a request
72
by the courts to appropriate officials rather than a proscription.
The authority of the courts to issue orders governing informational releases will depend largely upon judicial interpretation
of constitutional provisions, statutory declarations, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Although some courts will not be disposed to allow restrictions
due to the doctrine of separation of powers, as well as the fact that
the authority of the court would come into being only during judicial
proceedings, some problems may be overcome in certain instances.
In Lankford v. Gelston 7s the Fourth Circuit struck the balance
between the role of the federal courts in preserving constitutional
rights and the independence of state law enforcement officers in
favor of the courts. In this case an injunction was issued prohibiting
the police from conducting searches based only on uncorroborated
anonymous tips and without probable cause. The determining
factor in issuance of the injunction was that the searches were
unconstitutional and of such frequent occurance-300 searches in
less than one month-that an injunction was necessary to protect
the privacy of individuals. If a particuluar law enforcement agency
made frequent and continued flagrant disclosures of information of
a prejudicial or inflammatory nature the argument could be made
that the issuance of an injunction would be the only way to guarantee the accused his constitutional rights. Absent this situation,
there remains a serious jurisdictional question which the Reardon
Report overlooks.
As recent cases in this area point out, most courts have not
been disposed to encroach upon the powers of the executive branch
of government. This is despite the argument that the police are
inextricably linked to the courts in the criminal judicial process.
The second question to be considered is whether the proposed
restraints on informational releases by the police are constitutional
in light of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech.
The Committee believes that no substantial constitutional questions are raised by the proposed court rule. In the Tentative Draft
it is stated that there is less of a problem here than there was with
United Public Workers v. Mitchell74 where the Supreme Court
REPoRT at 19 & n.21.
364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
74 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
72 KAum'w
73
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upheld restrictions on the political activities of public servants in
order to maintain a more efficient public service. The Committee
states that the restrictions here rest on the more important base of
the right to fair trial. Although the Committee feels that the problem is no different when the restrictions are imposed by a different
branch of government, the distinction is of prime importance. The
allowance of the restrictions in Mitchell was based upon the contractual relationship of employer-employee; no such relationship
exists between courts and law enforcement officers.
Absent the employment relationship the constitutional rights of
the police officer, in most cases, are the same as those of the private
citizen. 75 Hence, the clear and present danger test must be met
before the court can impose any restrictions upon or punish abuses
of the freedom of speech.
The problem with the recommendations of the Reardon Report
is that they exhibit the potentiality of abridging free speech "across
the board." In the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota,8 the
Supreme Court construed as unconstitutional a state statute placing
a prior restraint on freedom of the press. The statute provided for
issuance of an injunction preventing the publication of certain
scandelous newspapers, disobedience of the injunctions being punishable by contempt. In taking this action the Court looked to the
substance of the order rather than to mere form, and in deciding
the constitutionality of the act rested its decision entirely upon the
operation and effect of the statute.77 The rationale underlying the
Court's decision was: (1) the statute was not aimed at the redress
of individual or private wrongs as other remedies remained available and unaffected, (2) the restraint, by its very nature, was
continuing rather than discrete in its operation, (3) the object of
the statute was suppression rather than punishment, and (4) the
statute operated not only to suppress but also to censor.78
Comparing the operation and effect of the proposed restrictions
in the Reardon Report with those of the court order and statute in
Near the similarities are patent. The proposed restrictions are aimed
at guaranteeing the accused a fair trial and maintaining the integrity
75

76
77
78

"[P]olicemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). Where a law enforcement officer was designated as a witness, or served the function of being a servant of the
court, obviously his status would change. See Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 394 (1962).
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Id. at 708.
Id. at 709-12.
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of the judicial process. However, they are not aimed at the redress
of wrongs as other remedies, e.g., voir dire and change of venue,
remain available to the potentially affected, and they do not allow
any recompense to the potentially injured if the wrong is committed.
If the recommendations are adopted as a standing court order, they
are continuing rather than discrete in their operation. There can be
little question that the purpose of the restrictions is to suppress
free speech rather than to punish an infractor for an abuse. The
primary purpose of the Reardon Report is to lay down guidelines
relating to the dissemination of information. Punishment is merely
provided to encourage adherence to the guidelines. Finally, the
recommendations censor information in that they specify what may
and what may not be released.
Cited with approval in Near was Dailey v. Superior Court79
where the respondent court issued an injunction preventing the
production of a play based upon a fact situation uncovered by a
coroner's inquest. The play was to be produced prior to the trial
of the accused who sought the injunction claiming that he would
be deprived of a fair trial and that production of the play would
be an obstruction to the administration of justice. The injunction
was overturned by the Supreme Court of California which concluded
its opinion by stating:
[Tihe order made by the trial court was an attempted restraint
upon the right of free speech, as guaranteed by the constitution
of this state, and... petitioner's mouth could not be closed in
advance for the purpose of preventing an utterance of his sentiments, however mischievous the prospective results of such utterance. He had the right of free speech, but at all times was responsible to the law for an abuse of that right.80
The foregoing discussion does not concern itself with the ability
of a court to impose sanctions for abuses to the freedom of speech.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has said that before an abuse can
be punished it must present a clear and present danger in which
the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high. The prior restraints on freedom of
speech that are laid down by the Reardon Report must be considered
in light of the clear and present danger test.
8
Directly on point is County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court. 1
An injunction, similar to that of the Reardon Report,82 was issued by
79 112 Cal. 94, 44 P. 458 (1896).
80

Id. at 100, 44 P. at 460.

81 253 Cal. App. 2d 670, 62 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1967).
82

Id. at 674-75, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39.
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the respondent court prohibiting informational releases by law
enforcement officers. The court order was adopted as a permanent
rule to apply to all future criminal cases. Although the order was
overturned on a jurisdictional issue, the court, in dicta, dwelled at
some length on the constitutional issue presented.
Concerning the problem of prejudicial pretrial publicity the
court said:
[W]e cannot say that it is necessary to silence the sources of pretrial publicity during the prearrangement period in order to protect
the right of every defendant to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
Nor can we say that the unrestricted release of information by the
district attorney or by the sheriff or any other peace officer during
that period about any person under arrest, standing alone, will
always result in a denial of constitutional due process to any such
person and that all such conduct is therefore illegal.83
The constitutional issue brought out by the foregoing case is
basic to the viability of the Reardon Report, at least to the extent
that it is adopted as a standing court order which is to apply to all
future criminal cases in the jurisdiction. Prior restraints will not
be allowed unless it can be shown in advance that in all cases to
which the restrictions apply there would be a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice. It is impossible to make
the predetermination that in all criminal cases the facts would
be such as to warrant a prior restraint under the recommendations
of the ReardonReport. Informational releases regarding confessions,
considered to be one of the most highly prejudicial types of information in ensuring a fair trial, might not be able to meet the test in
all instances. An example would be in a case where the accused
made a voluntary confession of guilt after being informed of his
rights or with the aid of counsel, the confession later being admitted
as evidence. Here the danger to the fairness of the trial would not
be so great as to require or permit suppression. Another example
would be dangers inherent in the release of prior criminal convictions. Little danger to the impartiality of the jury or the
accused's opportunity to fair trial would be presented if the prior
criminal record consisted of a twenty year old bad check charge
and the accused was now being held for a sex-murder. A court
order forbidding release of information whose prejudicial effects
are so uncertain and speculative as those of the previous examples
does not comport with the specificity and narrowness which the
Constitution requires.

83 Id. at 685, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46.
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84
It should also be mentioned that in such cases as Sheppard,
85
6
Estes v. Texas, and Rideau v. Louisiana the convictions were
overturned on the basis that the publicity accompanying the release
of prejudicial information was massive, persuasive, virulent, persistent, or widespread. It is questionable whether the convictions
would have been overturned if the qualifying adjectives had not
been necessary to describe the publicity.
This is not meant to say that the restrictions could never be
used. In the case that presents the probability, as distinct from
the possibility, of massive adverse and prejudicial publicity there
would be little problem with the court issuing an effective order
87
and meeting the constitutional requirements.

U.S. 333 (1966).
85 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
84384

86 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
87

In Bridges v. California the court said: "In accordance with what we
have said on the 'clear and present danger' cases, neither 'inherent
tendency' nor 'reasonable tendency' [to obstruct the administration
of justice] is enough to justify a restriction of free expression." 314
U.S. 252, 273 (1941). This came after an earlier statement, in the
same case, that "free speech and fair trials are two of the most
cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task

to choose between them." Id. at 260. These statements, which would

not allow the contention expressed by the authors in the text, have
since been modified by the Court in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951), wherein the Court adopted the rule as stated by Chief
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority in the same case in
the Second Circuit. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). The rule enunciated
is that in each case the courts must ask "whether the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.
1950). Under the Reardon Report the 'evil' is prejudicial publicity
and informational releases which allow or add to it. The improbability is pointed out in the American Newspaper Publishers Association Report wherein a study of the effect of pretrial crime news reporting was carried out. This study covered two years (ending in February
1965) and 40,000 jury trials of felony cases. Of these 40,000 cases, there
was a question of prejudice in only 101, with only 51 of these concerning prejudice resulting from newspaper reports. Of these 51,
relief was granted in only 5. ANPA SPECIAL CoMm. REPORT-FREE
PREss AND FAnR TRIAL at 6 (1967). The invasion of free speech necessary to avoid the danger is the proscription of information dissemination recommended by the Reardon Report. In light of the foregoing,
in the exceptional case, the court could issue an order which would
meet the required constitutional test. See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Court
order in State v. Ray, No. 16645, No. 16819 (Crim. Ct., Shelby Co.,
Tenn., July 18, 1968, as amended July 23, 1968); Court order in People
v. Sirhan, No. A 233421 (Super. Ct. of the State of Calif. for the
County of Los Angeles, June 7, 1968).
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2.3 RULE OF COURT RELATING TO DISCLOSURES BY JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES.
This section recommends that a rule of court be adopted prohibiting disclosure by court personnel of any information that
is not a matter of public record and which may "tend to interfere
with the right of the people or of the defendant to a fair trial."88
The necessity of having court personnel who are faithful to the
court is imperative to the smooth functioning of the criminal justice
system.
The last sentence of this section recommends that "[a]ppropriate
discipline, including proceedings for contempt, should be provided
for infractions of this rule."8 9 Clearly, there is no problem with
punishments meted out by the court to its direct employees.90 In
addition to contempt,91 the right to discharge for misconduct in the
performance of an official function is usually present. 92
2.4

RECO 1VENDATIONS RELATING TO JUDGES.

As most judges recognize the responsibilities of their positions
little trouble has resulted from prejudicial information attributable
to pronouncements by judges.9 3 The Canons of Judicial Ethics are
merely guidelines9 4 and for this reason disciplinary measures against
judges are seldom used, even where available.9 5 This section of the
Reardon Report condemns prejudicial publicity emanating from the
bench and does not vary from present requirements under the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. 96
PART I. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
CONDUCT OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES.
3.1

PRETRIAL HEARmGS.

Under section 3.1 of the Reardon Report, the accused is given
the right to move that the public, including newsmen, be excluded
from all or part of the pre-trial hearing. Unless there is no sub88 REARDON REPORT § 2.3.
89
90
91
92

REARDON REPORT § 2.3.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384

U.S. 333, 363 (1966).

18 U.S.C. § 401(2).
The right to discharge public employees will, to some extent, be gov-

erned by requirements of civil service regulations.
93 But cf. People v. McKay, 37 Cal. 2d 792, 236 P.2d 145
94 ABA CANoNs oF JuiciAL ETmcs, PREAMaLE.

(1951).

95 See BRAND, supra note 4, for a listing of disciplinary actions available
against judges in the states.

90 ABA CANONS Or JUDIcIAL ETics No. 4, No. 34. See BRAND, supra note

4, for a listing of adoption of Canons by state.
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stantial likelihood that matters inadmissible in evidence would
materialize the presiding officer is instructed to grant the motion.
The court is also given the power to close the hearing upon its own
motion or at the suggestion of the prosecution so long as the consent
of the accused is obtained.
Policy considerations commend the foregoing recommendation
to adoption in jurisdictions not presently having a governing court
rule or legislation to this effect. The reason is this: Where the
prosecution must show that it has a "case" against the accused,
information, not necessarily of evidentiary quality, will be proffered
by the prosecution; furthermore, at many preliminary hearings, the
accused would have no opportunity to defend himself, save for cross
examination. The accused's chances of impaneling an impartial jury
will be severely lessened if potentially prejudicial 9information was
released to the public during the pretrial hearing. 7
However, a serious conflict of policies exists as the public does
have an interest in the judicial process98 and the law "favors
publicity in legal proceedings, so far as the object can be obtained without injustice to the persons immediately concerned." 99
Mandatory closure of judicial proceedings would subvert one
policy while completely open hearings often would jeopardize the
accused's right to a fair trial. The Reardon Report's "no substantial
likelihood" standard strikes a fair balance between the interests of
the accused and the general public. Since it is difficult to ascertain
at the pretrial hearing whether the dissemination of information
presented would have a substantial likelihood of affecting the
subsequent trial, it may well be necessary to give the words "substantial likelihood" a liberal interpretation to ensure that the right
of the accused to a fair trial remains paramount to any right of
the public in an open trial at all stages of the judicial process.

97 See People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753

(1960).

98 "Courts are public institutions. The manner in which justice is ad-

ministered does not have any private aspects. To permit a hearing
held in open court to be kept secret, the order of secrecy being based
entirely on defendant's request, would take from the public its right
to be informed of a proceeding to which it is an interested party."
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 259, 418
99

P.2d 594, 596 (1966).
T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS

931-32 (Carrington ed. 1927),

quoted in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542 (1965). See also Oxnard
Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 261 A.C.A. 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83
(1968).
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In the event of closure the recommendation protects the interest
of the general public in that it requires a complete record of the
proceedings be released after the trial of the accused or after disposition without trial.

3.2

CHANGE OF VENUE OR CoNINANcE.

Section 3.2 of the recommendations of the Reardon Report
suggests that the standards of this section "be adopted in each
jurisdiction to govern the consideration and disposition of a motion
in a criminal case for change of venue or continuance based on
a claim of threatened interference with the right to a fair trial."100
While legisative enactment would be required in most jurisdictions,
in some only a court rule would be required. 1°1 Others would
demand a constitutional amendment.10 2 Regardless of which political or judicial appendage effectuates the change, the need is clear.
Where no constitutional amendment is required, change should be
made rapidly.
Subsection (a) provides that, excepting constitutional problems,
a change of venue or continuance may be granted on motion of
either the prosecution or the defense. It is somewhat unique to
allow the prosecution to ask for a change of venue or a continuance.
If one adopts the point of view that a fair trial means more than
just a fair trial for the accused, 10 3 then granting the prosecution the
right to a change of venue is a concomitant. However, the prosecution's right to a continuance or change of venue is tempered as it
cannot violate the accused's constitutional right to be tried in a
particular locality, nor can a continuance be so long as to jeopardize
the right to a speedy trial.10
Subsection (b) relates to methods of proving that a change of
venue or a continuance is needed in a particular case. This recommendation is radically different from provisions currently in general
use, which, in the main, provide that affadavits of individuals in
the community are required as support for granting a motion for
either of these procedural remedies. 10 5 The avowed purpose of this
100 REARDON REPORT § 3.2.
101 Note, 60 COLAT~. L. REv. 349, 360-65 (1960).
102 Id.
103 The state is ordinarily not guaranteed the right to a fair trial, i.e.,

the state, at common law, could not appeal an acquittal in a criminal
case. This right may be granted to the executive branch by statute,
and where it is granted the accused is not deprived of his constitutional rights. E.g., State v. Muolo, 118 Conn. 373, 172 A. 875 (1934).
104 See Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
105 E.g., NE. REv. STAT. § 29-1301 (Reissue 1964).
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subsection is to broaden the the methods of proof which are available to the defense (or in this case, to the prosecution also).106
To this end, the committee has made two principal changes from
the prevailing methodology of establishing prejudice. The first
is to strike the requirement that affadavits be required as a condition of granting either a continuance or a change of venue. The
use of affadavits as the sole or controlling indicia of community
sentiment, although concededly of some value, lacks a sense of
realism as the affiants would always be chosen for espousing the
"correct" point of view.
The other change in procedure authorized by the recommendations is the use of qualified opinion polls. 01 7 While the admissibility
of polls has not been the basis for a court decision on their merits,
several courts have considered the subject with their opinions
representing divergent views. 0 8 The valid objection that can be
raised in regard to surveys of this type is the ever present question
in regard to all sampling procedures, i.e., does the sample provide
a fair representation of the universe under examination? It is
submitted that if the trial court feels that the sample is sufficiently
large, and that the sample population is representative of the universe under study, then, technical niceties aside, the sampling
procedure should be admitted as evidence of prejudice. 10 9
Recommendations in section 3.2 (c) pertain to criteria for the
granting of a motion for a change of venue or a continuance. The
standard used is "reasonable likelihood" and is essentially an

106 REARDON B.EPORT-TENTATIV
107

DRAFT at 125.

No attempt will be made here to define what a "qualified opinion
poll" is, although the question is perhaps relevant. Let it simply be

said that the poll in order to be "qualified", should be a random
108

sample of that class of individuals that constitutes legally qualified
jurors in the jurisdiction.
Compare State v. Lupino, 268 Minn. 344, 129 N.W.2d 294 (1964) with

Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953) and State v. Ravenell, 43 N.J.
171, 203 A.2d 13 (1964). The Ravenell case is probably distinguishable because of the survey's results and, if this is true, then one
might speculate that the difference in the other two cases lies in the
time span between them, in that opinion polls are generally considered as being more scientific and having greater probative value
today.
109 However, in the interests of guaranteeing a fair trial, the probative

value of a survey showing that there was prejudice in the sample
population should be given greater weight than should the results,
in the same case, of a survey showing that there was no prejudice in
the sample population, ceteris paribus, as the remedies here are preventive ones.
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adaptation of the language of Sheppard.1 0° This standard is worthy
of adoption, by legislative action if necessary, in states that currently have more stringent requirements. Adoption of this standard
is necessary to bring the statutes in line with case law on the
subject.i
It is apparent from decided cases that identifiable
prejudice is not always necessary for reversal,1 2 for procedures
employed by the state may involve such a probability of prejudice
3
that they are deemed inherently lacking in due process."
The decision whether to grant a motion for either of these4
remedies is ordinarily left to the discretion of the trial judge."
However, he is often reluctant to admit that evenhanded justice
cannot be meted out in his court with the result being a refusal
to grant a continuance or a change of venue. Judges should be
encouraged to grant either of these motions, as the most important
factor to be considered is the accused's right to a fair trial; the
increment in costs to the taxpayer is clearly secondary. It should
also be noted that the exercise of discretion by the trial judge in
granting or refusing a motion has in the past been given great
weight on appeal. This is gradually being reconsidered as the
appellate courts are making an "independent evaluation of the
circumstances" rather than rubber-stamping the decision of the trial
judge., 5 In no case, however, should a motion of this type be
granted over the objection of the accused as the constitutional
guarantees of a fair and speedy trial in the jurisdiction in which
6
the crime was committed are those of the accused."
In the analysis of subsection 3.2 (d) it seems appropriate to
partially quote from the statements in the commentary to the
Tentative Draft of the Reardon Report. There, in discussing the
difficulties inherent in the common practice of denying a motion
for a continuance or a change of venue until there has been a
determination as to the attainability of a jury meeting the prevailing
standards, it was said:
110 "But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the
case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so
permeated with publicity." 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
111 Change of venue is a common law right; the standards vary by states
and are promulgated either by statute or by constitutional provision.
See 1 F. BuscH, LAw AxD TAcTics 3N JURY THALs § 32 (encyclopedic
ed. 1963).
112 E.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
113 Cases cited note 112 supra.
114 E.g., NEB. Rv. STAT. § 29-1391 (Reissue 1964).
115 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966); MEDINA REPORT at 57.
116 U.S. CoxsT. amend. VI.
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There are two principal difficulties with this approach. First, many
existing standards of acceptability tolerate considerable knowledge
of the case and even an opinion on the merits on the part of the
prospective juror. And even under a more restrictive standard,
there will remain the problem of obtaining accurate answers on
voir dire-is the juror consciously or subconsciously harboring
prejudice against the accused resulting from widespread news
coverage in the community? Thus if change of venue and continuance are to be of value, they should not turn on the results
of the voir dire; rather they should constitute independent remedies designed to assure fair trial when news coverage has raised
substantial doubts about the effectiveness of the voir dire standing
alone.
The second difficulty is that when disposition of a motion for
change of venue or continuance turns on the results of the voir
dire, defense counsel may be placed in an extremely difficult position. Knowing the conditions in the community, he may be more
inclined to accept a particular juror, even one who has expressed
an opinion, than to take his chances with other, less desirable
jurors who may be waiting in the wings. And yet to make an
adequate record for appellate review, he must object as much as
possible, and use up his peremptory challenges as
well. This
dilemma seems both unnecessary and undesirable.117
The remedies mentioned, change of venue and continuance,
are separate and independent remedies used to guarantee a fair
trial. They should not be made to hinge on one another or on
other available remedies such as the outcome of voir dire. Change
of venue is the appropriate remedy when there is prejudicial publicity or community sentiment, the effects of which are deemed
to have so permeated the jurisdiction as to not dissipate for some
time. Continuance is the appropriate remedy when it is adjudged
that the hostility that exists in the jurisdiction will pass in a
relatively short time. The use of the aforementioned remedies is
usually determined from the general community sentiment and
the pervasiveness and/or sensationalism of the prejudicial publicity
accompanying the case. These are admittedly subjective determinations but the subjectivity is of a different type than that involved
in voir dire examinations. In voir dire the subjectivity generally
relates to the juror's statements that he will be able to lay aside
any impression or opinion as to the accused's guilt and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court." 8 In this respect
the juror will be much like the judge who is unwilling to admit
that justice cannot be had in his courtroom. In addition, no matter
how honestly the juror answers questions of voir dire he may not
in reality be able to entirely put from his mind the preconceived

REPORT-TENTAV-E DRAFT at 126-27.
I's Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
117 REARDoN
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impression he may have."1 9 Logically then, the granting of a motion
for a change of venue or continuance should not hinge on the
outcome of voir dire and the seating of an acceptable jury.
The first recommendation of subsection 3.2 (e) is that the granting of one change of venue not be used as grounds for denial of
a second change of venue. Change of venue has been looked upon
as a statutory privilege in some instances rather than as a constitutional right.120 As such, some statutes prohibit a second change
of venue.' 21 In light of Irvin v. Dowd'22 it is questionable whether
change of venue is merely a statutory privilege. In Irvin an Indiana
statute 123 allowed only one change of venue, but the Court said this
was not subject to constitutional attack as the Indiana Supreme
Court had interpreted the statute to allow a second change of venue
if necessary to secure an impartial jury. 24 Denial of a second
change of venue, based upon statutory preclusion, when all of
the standards for the granting of the motion have been met might
well violate the minimal standards of due process which require
a fair trial in a fair tribunal.125 Consideration should be given to
the point that the Constitution speaks of the accused's right to a fair
trial, not the state's right to an inexpensive one. In light of the
foregoing, there seems to be no valid reason why a second change of
venue, if circumstances warrant, should not be granted as readily
as the first.
The second point raised by subsection 3.2 (e) concerns waiver
of the right to change of venue, and states, in effect, that the right
to move for a change of venue should not be deemed to have been
waived by the waiver of the right to trial by jury or by failure to
exercise all peremptory challenges. The arguments which pertain
to the first point of subsection 3.2 (e) relate with equal force to the
second. Failure to exercise all peremptory challenges should not be
construed to indicate that the accused is satisfied with the jury
selected. It could just as easily mean that, although not satisfied,
he is afraid he might subsequently not do as well in voir dire. In
this instance, it is unfair to the accused to require him to use all of
his peremptory challenges before he is given the right to move for
119 "The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent
that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of
the average man." Id. at 727.
120 E.g., State v. Cummins, 338 Mo. 609, 92 S.W.2d 605 (1936).
121 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 146, § 26 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
122 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
123 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1305 (1956).
124 366 U.S. at 720-21.
125 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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a change of venue. Likewise, it is unfair to consider the opportunity
for change of venue waived if trial by jury is waived 126 as the
defense's motivation in waiving the jury could be fear of the
inability to impanel an impartial jury. The remedies available to
insure the accused a fair trial should be considered as independent
and their use should not be interdependent upon one another.

3.3 WAivER OF JURY.
Section 3.3 of the Reardon Report recommends that in jurisdictions where the defendant does not have an absolute right to
waive a jury in a criminal trial that he be permitted to waive
it if: (1) the waiver has been knowingly and voluntarily made, and
(2) there is reason to believe that, as a result of the dissemination
of potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is required to increase
the likelihood of a fair trial. This section was included to give the
defendant yet another alternative in his quest for obtaining a trial
free from prejudicial publicity. The underlying theory is that the
court might be less influenced than would a potential jury by
prejudicial or inflammatory information.
Waiver of trial by jury would have enormous hurdles to overcome in some jurisdictions. The right of an accused to waive a
jury trial has been proscribed by constitutional provisions, statutes,
and court decision of the common law rules. Although the Constitution does not require that an accused be permitted to waive
the jury trial,127 it does not prohibit the waiver.12 At least sixteen
states have constitutional provisions relating to the right to waive
the jury trial in a criminal case,'129 and the provisions for the most
part have little in common. State statutes cover the problem in
much the same way as the constitutional provisions do; the common
law court decisions are similarly in conflict. The applicable law
being as divergent as it is, an examination of the provisions from
a theoretical standpoint is in order.
126

127
128
129

But see Butzman v. United States, 205 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1953) wherein
it was said: "He now contends that this was not a voluntary waiver
[of trial by jury] on his part, in that he was forced to do so by the
trial court's refusal to sustain his motion for a change of venue. The
argument is unsound. A different question would be presented if
appellant had carried through with his motion, interrogated the prospective jurors, and shown that a fair and impartial jury could not
have been obtained." Id. at 350.
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276- (1930).
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas,
Virginia, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
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Conceptually, the available alternatives are these: 130 (1) The
accused cannot in any case waive his right to a jury trial. (2) The
accused could under certain conditions waive his right. (3) The
accused might always waive his right.
Where the view has been adopted that the accused may never
a
waive his right, it has been upon the theory that jury trial is 131
basic part of the judicial process and is therefore not waiveable.
There are two arguments that readily answer this contention. The
first is that the right to a jury trial is a right of the accused, and
as it was enacted as a safeguard for the accused, he may voluntarily
waive his right.132 The second argument is that anytime the accused
pleads guilty he has, in effect, waived his right to jury trial.
A middle ground is that the accused may waive his right to the
jury trial under certain conditions; usually the consent of the
prosecution or trial judge, or both, is required. If the reasoning
is adopted that the right is one of the accused exclusively then
neither government counsel nor the trial judge should be permitted
to object so long as it is clear that accused knowingly has chosen
to forego trial by jury. The problem is that the right to a jury trial
is governed by either state constitution or statute. Where the
is specified, there is no alternative but to comply with
procedure
it. 13 3 The procedure of many states is in need of change.
The third alternative, that of allowing waiver of jury trial at the
election of the accused, is the only acceptable choice. The theory
espoused contrary to this position is that the state has an interest
in the outcome of the trial, and therefore it has the right to demand
a jury trial. 3 4 To allow the prosecution to restrict the right to
waive the jury trial is to say that the state may determine, in effect,
that there is no prejudicial publicity in the area. 135 Regarding the
trial judge's consent to waiver of jury trial, the same arguments
apply as apply to the state. 36 The argument is valid in this context
130 The discussion here will only concern provisions relating to major
crimes, i.e., felonies. Generally, in a misdemeanor proceeding the
accused may waive his right to a jury trial.
131 State v. Carman, 63 Iowa 130, 18 N.W. 691 (1884). This is probably
the prevailing view. See generafly 31 Am. Jur Jury § 50 (1958).
132 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930). See also People
v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 125 N.E.2d 468 (1955).
133 See generally Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930), on
the history of this right.
134 State v. Ricks, 173 Kan. 660, 250 P.2d 773 (1952).
135 It is of course possible that waiver of a jury trial may be desired by
the prosecution for other reasons also.
136 This is of course assuming that counsel appointed to represent an
indigent would abide by his duty to his client. If he did not, giving
the judge discretion could be a valuable safeguard.
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that the judge should be more impervious to outside influences than
would the jury. This provision could be used as a last resort if all
other attempts concerning the use of controlling publicity should
fail. As the accused is the one most interested in the fairness of
his trial, there is no compelling reason to allow any judicial discretion in ruling on the waiver if the accused, with advice of
counsel, wishes to waive it.
The Reardon Report would require that waiver of jury trial be
knowingly and voluntarily given. The United States Supreme Court
in Adams v. United States ex rel McCann 17 held that the defendant
could waive a jury trial without the aid of counsel; however, as
this was a pre-Gideon'38 decision, it may be fairly inferred that the
advice of counsel would be necessary to a successful waiver where
counsel had been retained or appointed." 9 The theory underlying
the Gideon decision is that a layman could never adequately conduct
his own defense.140 If this is true, then counsel would be necessary
for a successful waiver of a jury trial.
The second requirement of this section is conjunctive with the
first and would allow a judge to refuse waiver of jury trial if, in
light of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, he
felt the waiver was not required to increase the likelihood of a fair
trial. The commentary accompanying the Tentative Draft refines
the foregoing by saying that in determining whether to allow
waiver, the judge is to look at the reasonableness of the defendant's
decision, but he is not to make an independent evaluation of the
situation. 141

3.4 SELECTING THE JURY.
Three provisions of this section govern jury selection in cases
where possible prejudice is present. Subsection (a) delineates the
procedure to be followed during voir dire examination. The purpose
of voir dire is to determine what preconceived notions, if any,
prospective jurors have and their ability to set them aside, thus
insuring an impartial verdict based solely upon evidence presented
at the trial.14 Specifically, the Reardon Report focuses in subsection (a) upon the methodology of the voir dire conducive to eliciting
'37 317 U.S. 605 (1942).
138 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
139 Compare Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) with Gideon

v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

140 372 U.S. at 344-45.
141 R- RUoN REPORT-TENTATnE DRAPT at 130.

142 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
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candid answers from prospective jurors. Three recommendations
are made. The first is that a prospective juror should not be
examined in the presence of other chosen or prospective jurors.
If the questioning of a prospective juror is conducted in the presence
of other prospective jurors, the difficulty is increased for a person to
say that he could not be impartial. Candid responses are more
1 43
likely to be elicited when individuals are questioned separately.
Furthermore, the possibility is not remote that other jurors might be
exposed to inadmissible extrajudicial information during the examination.
The second recommendation is that the talesman be questioned
in such a manner as to convince him that he would not be remiss
if unable to cast aside preconceptions. The prospective juror must
not be intimidated and must be impressed with the fact that impartiality should not be forced.
The final recommendation is that a complete record be kept of
the examination to facilitate appellate review.
Subsection (b) delineates, in relation to prospective jurors, a
standard of acceptability. Two factors are relevant: (1) The prospect's state of mind; and (2) The prospect's degree of exposure.
Four guidelines are commended.
If the prospective juror states he is unable to overcome his
preconceptions, he is subject to challenge for cause no matter how
slight his exposure. Clearly, this result is required.
The second guideline relates to information which the talesman
has been exposed to and remembers, and which is to be developed
during the trial, or which is inadmissible at trial but yet not so
prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of affecting his judgment.
His acceptability in this regard is to hinge on whether his testimony
as to impartiality is believed. When it is required that a jury be
so fair and impartial as to determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is anomalous to say that the
juror will not be subject to challenge unless there is a substantial
risk that his judgment has been affected by exposure or, if the risk
is less than substantial, that he will be excused only if his testimony
as to impartiality is disbelieved. Because both determinations are
subjective an accused should be subjected to a lesser degree of risk
to insure juror impartiality. 144 Line drawing presents linguistic
distinctions that the realities of the courtroom find superfluous.
143

E.g., United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).

144 But see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). "It is not required, how-

ever, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues
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The third guideline of acceptability provides that if the prospective juror admits to having formed an opinion that he will be
subject to challenge unless examination shows unequivocally that
he can be impartial. Considering the subjectivity of the voir dire,
once a prospective juror has admitted having formed an opinion,
no subjective analysis should be acceptable to overcome the presumption of partiality that is raised.
The final guideline of acceptability allows challenge for cause
regardless of testimony as to his state of mind if the prospective
juror has been exposed to and remembers reports of highly significant information such as inadmissible evidence, a confession, or
substantial amounts of highly inflammatory information. While
this final recommendation follows the minimum constitutional
criteria; nevertheless, prudence, in light of the other guidelines,
militates towards the conclusion that a juror should be excluded
if he has ever been exposed to and remembers information of this
quality.
Although essentially following constitutional guidelines laid
down by the Supreme Court as applicable to the states, 145 the
recommendations in this section fall short of allowing the most
impartiality that is possible. The recommendations are of questionable validity in the federal courts in light of Marshall v. United
States. 46 In Marshallthe Supreme Court, exercising its rule making
power over federal courts, held a new trial was warranted even
though jurors who had been exposed to inadmissible evidence said
that they could disregard it to reach an impartial verdict. The
Court was concerned with potentially prejudicial information
whereas the rule that has been applied to the state courts, and which
the Reardon Report substantially 47 follows, has been limited to
inherently prejudicial information.1
involved. In three days of swift, widespread and diverse methods
of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the
interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best
qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or
opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal

145

cases. To hold that any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an
impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court." Id. at 722-23.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 351-54 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963).

146
147

360 U.S. 310 (1959).
See cases cited note 145 supra.
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Subsection 3.4 (c) of the Reardon Report recommends that the
courts have the authority to draw jurors from other localities
whenever the prejudicial news coverage has been intensive and
concentrated in a given locality. Although the Committee recognizes that change of venire is not as effective as change of venue,
they do recommend its use in the foregoing situation.
It is submitted that the inherent difficulties with change of
venire are so numerous that its usefulness must be called into
serious question. Assuming, arguendo, that prejudicial publicity
and concomitantly adverse community sentiment has so permeated
the locality as to require either a change of venue or change of
venire to ensure a fair trial, a change of venue would be the only
viable method. Change of venire, drawing jurors from outside
the range of community sentiment, would place the virgin talesmen
in the locus of adversity. If the jurors were not sequestered and
prevented access to the news media, they could not help but to be
influenced by the community sentiment. 148

Furthermore, if the

jurors were to be sequestered and prevented access to the local
news media, they could well develop a conscious or subconscious
resentment of the accused due to the restrictions that had been
placed upon them.
If the foregoing be true, a problem may also arise concerning
whether it would be prejudicial error to refuse a change of venue
but yet grant a change of venire. 149
3.5

CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL.

Section 3.5 addresses itself to the conduct of the trial The
guidelines articulated are essentially those of Estes 50 and Shep51 In Estes it was
pard.1
stated that the accused is entitled to judicial
serenity and calm which was most notable for its absence in that
case. 1- 2 The Court in Sheppard stated that "[t]he carnival atmos-

phere at the trial could easily have been avoided since the courtroom and the courthouse premises are subject to the control of
the court.' u

3

Both of these cases considered the problems en-

gendered by actions of the news media at the trial. Section 3.5 (a)

148 Bradley v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 635, 642, 265 S.W. 291, 295 (1924).
149 Williams v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 570, 154 S.W.2d 563 (1941). See
Annot., 136 A.L.R. 1405 (1942).
150 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
151 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
152

381 U.S. at 536.

153 384 U.S. at 358.
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recommends that the court ensure courtroom decorum by instructing representatives of the news media as to permissible uses of the

courtroom.'"
Sequestration of the jury upon motion of either attorney or upon
the court's own motion is recommended by subsection 3.5 (b) if
highly prejudicial matters are likely to come to the attention of
the jurors in the absence of this safeguard. In Sheppard the Court
stated that the question should have been raised sua sponte with
counsel because of the notoriety of the case.
Although a more liberal use of sequestration is recommended,
there are many problems inherent with this method of ensuring
an impartial jury. 15 5 The least is the increment in cost to the state.
The major problem is that the length of many trials would create
an undue hardship upon the jurors. Jurors who are unhappy with
sequestration may well become, either consciously or subconsciously,
prejudiced against the accused. The recommendation that the judge,
in advising the jury of sequestration, should not disclose the party
who requested the action is not adequate to overcome the foregoing
problem as the action would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, be attributable to the accused.
Recommended standard 3.5 (c) is directed to the cautioning of
parties, witnesses, jurors, and judicial employees against making
extrajudicial statements relating to the case or the issues. A court,
under this subsection, could direct that witnesses be sequestered
prior to their testimony. As to extrajudicial statements by any of
the above persons, the recommendation is weak. The court should
not be hesitant to impose orders, punishable by contempt, prohibiting extrajudicial statements bearing on the merits of the case.
The latter recommendation would be more effective in prohibiting
extrajudicial releases by those within the court's power and would
also tend to prevent the case from being tried in the news media.
No serious constitutional problem is presented by this proposal as
the persons all come within the purview of the court during the
trial 15 6 Generally sequestration of witnesses meets with the same

15

In Estes it was stated that live televising of a trial is an inherent
denial of due process. 381 U.S. at 544. See also KAUFVIAN REPORT at
40-41.

155 See MEDINA REPORT at 58; REARDON
156

REPORT-TENTATIVE DRAFT at

141-42.
"The trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements
by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters...." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966)
(emphasis added). See also MEDNA REPORT at 54-57.
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objections as sequestration of jurors, but may, nevertheless, be
necessary in cases accompanied by a high degree of community
157
interest and widespread publicity.
Exclusion of the public from hearings5 8 or arguments outside
the presence of the jury, unless the jury is sequestered, upon the
defendant's motion, is recommended by section 3.5 (d). This recommendation strikes a fair balance between the interests of the accused
and the interests of the general public in an open trial.6 9 It should
be noted that this recommendation would not exclude the public
over the objections of the accused, thus guaranteeing his right to a
public trial. The desirable objective is to prevent the dissemination
of information adduced outside the presence of the jury which
would be likely to interfere with the accused's right to an impartial
60

jury.1

If there is a substantial likelihood of interference the motion for
exclusion of the public should be granted. If the jury is sequestered
there would be no need for this closure, and the motion should not
be granted if made, for the information adduced will not be available to the jury. The interest in an open and public trial would
outweigh the interest. of the accused in keeping the proceeding
secret.
If the jury is not sequestered and the public is excluded from
the trial, a complete record of the proceedings is to be kept and
made available to the public at the close of the trial. This requirement is the same as that of section 3.1, supra, relating to closure of
preliminary hearings.
A caveat is in order however. If there is a possibility of prejudicial publicity that warrants closure of the hearing or argument,
the closure should be complete. If the hearing was left open, it
would most likely be considered public in the same manner that the
trial itself is considered public. If so, the dissemination of information adduced at the hearing by either the news media or other
members of the public would not be punishable unless there was
some abuse of the first amendment freedoms. "A trial is a public

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966). But see MEDINA REPORT at 56.
158 The hearings contemplated by this section are those during the trial
but outside the presence of the jury. An example would be that
required on the voluntariness of a confession.
189 See generally the discussion accompanying section 3.1, supra.
160 E.g., motion for mistrial, attempted supression of evidence or testimony.
'57
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161
event. What transpires in the court room is public property."
In light of this it is doubtful that an abuse could be found from
which sanctions might be imposed. If the hearing were to be
closed, no objection could be raised.

Subsection 3.5 (e) contains a suggested form for cautionary
instructions to the jury relating to the exposure of the jury to
news reports. The instructions request that the jury refrain from
exposure to news reports, giving the reasons why the jurors should
refrain from this type of exposure. Giving the jury the reasoning
underlying the request is laudable in that it explains to them the
basis of the request that they refrain from news exposure. The
reason, of course, is that news reports are not subject to the same
standards as evidence in court, e.g., hearsay evidence is often
incorporated in news media reports. Thus news reports may bias
one side to the detriment of the other. It is also recommended
that the instruction be repeated from time to time during the
course of the trial. The Medina Report advocates a stronger stand
than does the Reardon Report by stating that in some cases the
jurors should be required to sign, under oath, a written statement
containing a solemn promise not to avail themselves of any access
to the news media. Violation of this pledge is punishable by
contempt. 162 It cannot be questioned that a pledge of this type could
be obtained and the violation of it punished by contempt proceedings as during the course of the trial the jurors are under the
control of the court. 1 63 When a pledge of this type is used together
with a court order prohibiting extrajudicial statements by the
jurors, violation of either being punishable by contempt, a significant advance will have been taken in assuring the accused a fair
trial. In addition, the two, taken together, will impress upon the
juror his duty to the court and to the accused. These procedures
should be stringent enough to overcome the need for sequestration
with its inherent shortcomings. With the foregoing in mind, it is
suggested that orders and/or pledges of this type be used jointly
and frequently. They should not be restricted to use in a trial only
after the accused has become a cause cdltbre.
Section 3.5 (f) is concerned with the questioning of jurors about
exposure to potentially prejudicial material during the course of
the trial. The standard to be used in excusing a juror due to
,exposure is also articulated. The Committee recommends individual
161 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). E.g., Phoenix Newspapers,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966).
162
mEDINA REPORT at 52-53.
163 See note 156 supra.
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questioning of jurors in regard to their possible exposure. The
method advocated is the same as that recommended for the voiz
dire examination. Questioning is recommended when the possibility arises that a juror or the jury has been exposed to information
that goes beyond the record and raises serious questions of prejudice.
Examination may be conducted at the motion of either party or by
the court sua sponte.
The one difference between the recommended standards for
juror acceptability and excuse is that a juror shall be excused if
he has seen or heard potentially prejudicial material which, if
referred to at the trial would have required the declaration of a
mistrial.' 64 There should be no question as to the reasoning behind
these standards as the only difference between declaring a mistrial
and excusing a juror is whether one or all of the jurors have been
exposed to the prejudicial material. It should be noted that when a
juror is excused either an alternative juror must be substituted 6 5
or, if the number of jurors falls below twelve, consent of the accused
must be obtained to continue the trial.168 The alternative to the
latter situation is the declaration of a mistrial.
The standard for excusing a juror who is challenged on the
basis of such exposure is identical to the standard for juror acceptability discussed in regard to subsection 3.4(b), supra. As the
same comments apply to acceptability or excuse of jurors, there
will be no extended comment here. Suffice it to say that although
the recommendations are constitutionally acceptable, they do not
67
go far enough to ensure impartiality of the jurors.
3.6 SETTING ASIDE Tm VERDIcT.
The Reardon Report in section 3.6 recommends that the court
set aside a verdict and grant a new trial whenever there is found
a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was
influenced by exposure to an extrajudicial communication of any
164 For a listing of cases and discussion of the type of prejudicial information allowing a motion for mistrial see 5. F. BuscH,
IN JuRY

LAw AND TACTICs

TmiAs § 610 (encyclopedic ed. 1963). Generally a mistrial

will be declared if the court feels that the striking of the information
from the record and the directing of the jury to disregard it is not
sufficient to cure the error.

165 Provisions for alternative jurors have been made in practically all
states. 1 F. BuscH, LAw AND TAcTIcs 3n JuRY TtaALS § 25 (encyclopedic ed. 1963).
166 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
167 Compare discussion of section 3.4(b), supra, with REARDON REPORTTENTATiVE DRAFT at

131-37.

1082

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 4 (1969)

matter relating to the accused or to the case itself. The section
states that this recommendation is not meant to affect the rule in
any jurisdiction as to when and if a juror may impeach his own
verdict or as to what evidence may be competent for that purpose.
At common law, a juror was never able to impeach his own
verdict, and the court was required to obtain its knowledge as to
a juror's misconduct from another source. 68 The basis of the rule
was protection of the secrecy and independence of the jury deliberations without the jurors being subject to inquiry as to the motives
and methods used in reaching a verdict. Although this English
rule was almost universally adopted in the United States, it has
gradually eroded, exception being taken and distinction being
made. 6 9
The general rule now used as to a juror's impeachment of his
own verdict is more accurately reflected by the United States
Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States.70 Briefly stated, the
case held that public policy forbids that a matter resting in the
personal consciousness of a juror be used to overturn a verdict;
however, evidence of an overt act, open to the knowledge of all the
jury, may be received. 71' The Mattox rule will allow a juror to
testify as to the existence of an extraneous influence in the jury
room, e.g., a newspaper containing a story on the case, but not as
to the effect which the influence had upon him or upon the other
jurors.'7 2
Discretion of the court comes into play at this point as the court
must make a determination as to whether there was a substantial
likelihood that the extraneous influence affected the vote of one or
more jurors. If so, a mistrial must be declared and a new trial
granted.
Statutes generally provide that there must be substantial
prejudice shown before a verdict may be set aside. 73 The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 74 allow the granting of a new trial
if it is required in the interest of justice. The rule of the federal
courts allows more discretion than do some state statutes. In
168 Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).

169 See 8 J. WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

§§ 2345-56 (McNaughton rev. 1961); F.

JAMEs, CiviL PROCEDURE § 7.19 (1965).
170 146 U.S. 140 (1892). See also Perry v. Baily, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1874).
'17 E.g., Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1871).
172 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-49 (1892).
173 For a listing see 5 F. BuscH, LAW AND TAcTIcs IN JURY TRiALs § 741
(encyclopedia ed. 1963).
'74 FED. R. CRnvt. P. 23.
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criminal cases the presumption that the extraneous influence
175
affected the verdict is more readily indulged than in a civil case,
and correctly so.'

6

The test to be applied in criminal cases in

making a determination of whether to grant a new trial is whether
the extraneous influence had the capacity to effect the result of
the trial, not whether it in fact did.17 7 The recommendations then
simply restate existing law.
Policy considerations dictate that the rule as restated by this
section be continued. Other recommendations have been directed
at maintaining the impartiality necessary for a fair trial, but they
have been criticized in some instances for not maintaining a high
enough degree of impartiality. The procedure outlined above is
directed at protecting the secrecy and independence of the jury
which is necessary to the proper functioning of the criminal justice
system. The procedure is appropriate in that it maintains a balance
between an independent and secret jury system and the guaranteeing of a fair trial to the accused.
A motion for the declaration of a mistrial or appellate review,
both of which are aimed at starting the process over, are also
available to the accused.
PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
EXERCISING OF THE CONTEMPT POWER
4.1 LnmnTEi USE OF THE CONTEMPT POWER.
This section of the Reardon Report recommends a limited use
of the contempt power when extrajudicial information has been
disseminated. Subsection (a) calls for the use of the contempt
power in two instances against anyone knowing that a criminal
trial by jury is in progress or that a jury is being chosen. The first
is against a person who disseminates by means of public communication an extrajudicial statement relating to the accused or
the issues in the case that goes beyond the public record in the
case. The requirements are that the extrajudicial statement be
wilfully designed to affect the outcome of the trial and that it
seriously threatens to have such an effect. The second instance is
175
176

177

See 5 F. BuscH, LAW AND TACTICS iN JURY TaALs § 727 (encyclopedic
ed. 1963).
The underlying reason is that in a civil case a preponderance of evidence is all that is necessary to convict whereas criminal cases require that the accused be deemed guilty beyond any reasonable doubt.
Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 164 A.2d 179 (1960).

1084

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 4 (1969)

that the power be exercised if, rather than being disseminated by
public communication, the extrajudicial statement was made with
the intention that it be disseminated by public communication.
There are several weaknesses with this recommendation. One
major shortcoming is that the recommendation could not be adopted
for use in the federal courts as they are empowered only to punish
contempts committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice.178 The applicable
provisions of the United States Code being construed as requiring
a geographic rather than a causal connection, 179 the federal courts
are limited to punishing direct contempts.
The question arises whether the conditions for invoking the
sanction of this subsection could ever occur. For a contempt to
be invoked under this recommendation a statement made in the
presence of the court, being wilfully designed to affect the outcome
of the trial, and seriously threatening to have that effect would be
required. Furthermore, such a statement would have to have been
intended for dissemination by public communication. Most, if not
all, statements falling under this recommendation would therefore
be outside the presence of the court and indirect contempts. This
would prohibit federal courts or state courts with provisions similar
to the federal statutes from punishing such statements. A mistrial
could be declared if actions of this nature were taken, and where
adequate authority exists, summary contempt proceedings could be
allowed as there would have been a threat to the administration
of justice.
There is little case law on the requirement of wilfulness or
intent in contempt proceedings. Although intent is generally not
necessary in civil contempt proceedings, it has, in some jurisdictions,
been imposed as a requirement in criminal contempt proceedings. 80
A determination as to whether the recommendation of this subsection calls for criminal or civil contempt is then necessary. The
purpose of the contempt proceeding, not the character of the act
8
punished, is determinative of the character of the proceeding..
A contempt is considered civil when it is wholly remedial and is
not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public.8 2 Conversely, the purpose of the Reardon Report's recommendation is of
178

18 U.S.C. § 401(1).

U.S. 33, 48 (1941).
1s0 E.g., Duemling v. Fort Wayne Community Concerts, Inc., 243 Ind. 521,
179 Nye v. United States, 313
181

182

188 N.E.2d 274 (1963).
Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 220 (1932).
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42 (1941).
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a punitive nature. Thus any proceeding under it would be classified as a criminal contempt proceeding, punishing an indirect
contempt. In the case of an indirect criminal contempt by publication, the usual requirement is that when contemptuous intent is
denied the language used must, without the aid of innuendoes, be
clear and not susceptible to a construction with an innocent intent.
Otherwise, the alleged contemnor must be discharged. 183 The foregoing would seem to make the proposal ineffective except in cases
of extreme and outrageous action.
As indicated by the Committee there would be very few instances
in which the contempt power would be used. 184 In light of the vague
outlines of the contempt power, it is doubtful if the recommendations have added anything to the usefulness of this power. The most
serious drawback to the recommendation is that, although not
specifically stated, it would allow contempt proceedings against the
news media if the latter's action fell within the guidelines of the
rule. The Committee has stated that "seriously threatens" is
another way of saying "clear and present danger;"'18 however, the
recommendation does not say clear and present danger and if
adopted might be construed to mean something less. In light of
Supreme Court decisions requiring a clear and present danger' 86 in
which the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished, 8 7 the question becomes not so much when a member of
the news media can be punished, but rather if he can be punished.
The Supreme Court has never decided the contempt question in
regard to newspapers and jury trials and has admitted that it
would be a trying task to choose between the freedoms of the
first and sixth amendments. 188 Cases before the Court have always
focused on judges who are considered to be more impervious to
this type of statement than are juries.
It should also be noted that in Bridges v. California8 9 the court
said that neither the inherent tendency nor the reasonable tendency
of statements to obstruct the administration of justice is enough
to warrant restrictions or punishment. 190 Although it might be
183 LeGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 698 n.6, 153 N.E.2d 593, 598 n.6 (1958).
184 REARDON REPORT-TENTATIVE DRAFT at 69-72.
185 Compare REARDON REPORT at 27-28 with REARDON REPORT-TENTATIVE
DRAFT at 152.
186 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
187 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).

18 Id. at 260.
189 314 U.S. 252 (1941).

190 Id. at 273.
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argued that in light of Estes and Sheppard the Supreme Court
would be willing to relax the clear and present danger standard
somewhat, it is submitted that such will not be the case. The
standard for reversal has become less tolerant of publicity, but
the clear and present danger test in regard to contempt has
remained unchanged. Because of the Court's recommendations
regarding the control of prejudicial news at its source, it is doubtful
that the Court would allow a contempt conviction of a portion of
the news media to stand until the other avenues suggested have
been more fully explored. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court
would make an encroachment upon the first amendment liberties
without first determining the absolute necessity of such action and
finding that it would be the only way by which to guarantee a
fair trial.
The last recommended use of the contempt power is found in
subsection (b). It is recommended that the power be exercised
against any person who knowingly violates a valid judicial order
not to disseminate information until the completion of the trial
or disposition without trial. The judicial order in question would
relate specifically to information referred to in the course of a
judicial hearing closed pursuant to section 3.1191 or 3.5 (d) .192
There seems little doubt that the courts can punish by contempt
proceedings when a valid judicial order has been issued. The
recommendation follows accepted guidelines in giving the prerequisites needed before violation of a valid court order is punishable by contempt. To effect punishment for contempt of a court
order, the alleged contemnor must have knowledge' 93 of a valid
order. 9 4

The most serious problem with this recommendation comes to
light when reading the commentary accompanying the Tentative
Draft and the Approved Draft. Here the Committee indicates
that a news media representative who obtains information about
191

Section 3.1 provides for the closing of a pretrial hearing when the

dissemination of evidence or argument adduced at the hearing would
otherwise disclose matter that could be inadmissible as evidence or
might otherwise interfere with the accused's right to an impartial
jury.
192 Section 3.5(d) is much the same as 3.1, note 191 supra, except that
it relates to hearings or arguments outside the presence of the jury
during the course of the trial
193 E.g., United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 729 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953); Collins v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 2d
354, 310 P.2d 103 (1957).
194

E.g., Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962); People v. Prouty, 262 Ill.
218, 104 N.E. 387 (1914).
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the closed hearing from a participant or court employee and then
violates the order not to disclose would be subject to contempt
proceedings under this section. 195 A court employee or participant
in the proceeding would be subject to contempt but in light of the
previous discussion concerning the freedom of speech and press it
is extremely doubtful that the application of this court order to
the news media would be a valid exercise of the court's jurisdiction.196 If the order, to the extent that it affects the news media, is
made without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction, the dis197
obedience is not punishable.
A reading of subsection (b) indicates that it would apply to
the participants and court employees taking part in the closed
hearing and to no others. The Committee obviously feels the
language is clear enough to include the news media also. Adopting
the former viewpoint, the recommendation would be desirable;
adopting the Committee's viewpoint, the recommendation has serious, if not fatal shortcomings and should not be and probably could
not be used to impose sanctions upon the press. This is not to say
that if the news media abused the freedom of speech or press that
the abuse could not be used as the basis for the imposition of
sanctions; however, a prior restraint would not be constitutionally
permissible. 98
CONCLUSION
The problem presented is incapable of a satisfactory solution.
Media of publicity have the right to report what happens in open
court. An accused has a right to a trial by an impartial jury on
evidence which is legally admissible. The public has the right to
demand and expect a fair trial designed to end in just judgments.
These rights must be accommodated in the best possible manner.199
The Reardon Report is an attempt to resolve these conflicting
values. The resolution of the Reardon Report is not satisfactory.
195 Compare RERADoN
REPORT at 28.

ERPORT-TENTATEVE DaRFT

at 152-54 with

REARnoN

196 The argument here is much like that presented in the discussion of

§ 2.2 and accompanying footnotes, supra. If the court order here is to
apply to the news media it must meet the clear and present danger

test; otherwise it will fall into the category of a prior restraint which
is clearly invalid and violation of which cannot operate as a springboard for sanctions. As already discussed in regard to § 4.1(a) it is
extremely doubtful that the clear and present danger test can be
met to allow restraining orders and punishment for their violation.
197 See cases cited note 193, supra.
19s Compare Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) with Daily v. Superior
Court, 112 Cal. 94, 44 P. 458 (1896).

'99

Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1967).
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In light of the constitutional problems that are inherent in some
of the recommendations, it is suggested that its restraints be used
only if and when needed, i.e., in the exceptional case.200 The courts
should use presently available remedies more effectively and
readily in seeking to guarantee a fair trial. Although these safeguards are probably less efficient than the stifling of free speech,
they could be used more effectively than they presently are without
endangering either the constitutional or jurisdictional problems
201
inherent in some sections of the Reardon Report.
M. Douglas Deitchler '70
Howard Fredrick Hahn '70
Recipients of the Best
Student Articles Award
APPENDIX
Approved Draft of Standards*
PART I.

1.1

RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT
OF ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL CASES

REVISION OF THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

It is recommended that the substance of the following standards,
relating to public discussion of pending or imminent criminal litigation, be embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
It is the duty of the lawyer not to release or authorize the
release of information or opinion for dissemination by any means
of public communication, in connection with pending or imminent
criminal litigation with which he is associated, if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair
trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
With respect to a grand jury or other pending investigation
of any criminal matter, a lawyer participating in the investigation
shall refrain from making any extrajudicial statement, for dissemination by any means of public communication, that goes
beyond the public record or that is not necessary to inform the
public that the investigation is underway, to describe the general
200 See note 87, supra.
201 See text discussing § 2.2 and accompanying footnotes, supra.
* ADVISORY COinVUTTRE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON

MIRIIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRnVIINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS-APPROVED DRAFT (1968) is under copyright
to the ABA and is reprinted here with their permission.
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scope of the investigation, to obtain assistance in the apprehension
of a suspect, to warn the public of any dangers, or otherwise aid
in the investigation.
From the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant, or
the filing of a complaint, information, or indictment in any criminal
matter until the commencement of trial or disposition without trial,
a lawyer associated with the prosecution or defense shall not
release or authorize the release of any extrajudicial statement, for
dissemination by any means of public communication, relating to
that matter and concerning:
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments,
or other charges of crime), or the character or reputation of
the accused, except that the lawyer may make a factual statement of the accused's name, age, residence, occupation, and
family status, and if the accused has not been apprehended,
a lawyer associated with the prosecution may release any
information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn
the public of any dangers he may present;
(2) The existence or contents of any confession, admission,
or statement given by the accused, or the refusal or failure of
the accused to make any statement;
(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or the
accused's refusal or failure to submit to an examination or
test;
(4) The identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses, except that the lawyer may announce the identity of
the victim if the announcement is not otherwise prohibited
by law;
(5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged
or a lesser offense;
(6) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence or as to
the merits of the case or the evidence in the case.
The foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the lawyer
during this period, in the proper discharge of his official or professional obligations, from announcing the fact and circumstances
of arrest (including time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit,
and the use of weapons), the identity of the investigating and
arresting officer or agency, and the length of the investigation; from
making an announcement, at the time of seizure of any physical
evidence other than a confession, admission or statement, which is
limited to a description of the evidence seized; from disclosing the
nature, substance, or text of the charge, including a brief description
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of the offense charged; from quoting or referring without comment
to public records of the court in the case; from announcing the
scheduling or result of any stage in the judicial process; from
requesting assistance in obtaining evidence; or from announcing
without further comment that the accused denies the charges made
against him.
During the trial of any criminal matter, including the period
of selection of the jury, no lawyer associated with the prosecution
or defense shall give or authorize any extrajudicial statement or
interview, relating to the trial or the parties or issues in the trial,
for dissemination by any means of public communication, except
that the lawyer may quote from or refer without comment to public
records of the court in the case.
After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of
any criminal matter, and prior to the imposition of sentence, a
lawyer associated with the prosecution or defense shall refrain
from making or authorizing any extrajudicial statement for dissemination by any means of public communication if there is a
reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will affect the imposition of sentence.
Nothing in this Canon is intended to preclude the formulation
or application of more restrictive rules relating to the release of
information about juvenile or other offenders, to preclude the
holding of hearings or the lawful issuance of reports by legislative,
administrative, or investigative bodies, or to preclude any lawyer
from replying to charges of misconduct that are publicly made
against him.
1.2

RuiE OF COURT.

In any jurisdiction in which Canons of Professional Ethics have
not been adopted by statute or court rule, it is recommended that
the substance of the foregoing section be adopted as a rule of court
governing the conduct of attorneys.
1.3 ENFORCEMENT.
It is recommended that violation of the standards set forth
in section 1.1 shall be grounds for judicial and bar association
reprimand or for suspension from practice and, in more serious
cases, for disbarment. It is further recommended that any attorney
or bar association be allowed to petition an appropriate court for
the institution of disciplinary proceedings, and that the court have
discretion to initiate such proceedings, either on the basis of such
a petition or on its own motion.
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PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, JUDGES, AND
JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES IN CRIMINAL CASES.
2.1 DEPARTMENTAL RuLEs.
It is recommended that law enforcement agencies in each jurisdiction adopt the following internal regulations:
(a) A regulation governing the release of information, relating
to the commission of crimes and to their investigation, prior to the
making of an arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant, or the filing of
formal charges. This regulation should establish appropriate procedures for the release of information. It should further provide
that, when a crime is believed to have been committed, pertinent
facts relating to the crime itself and to investigative procedures
may properly be made available but the identity of a suspect prior
to arrest and the results of investigative procedures shall not be
disclosed except to the extent necessary to aid in the investigation,
to assist in the apprehension of the suspect, or to warn the public
of any dangers.
(b) A regulation prohibiting (i) the deliberate posing of a
person in custody for photographing or televising by representatives
of the news media and (ii) the interviewing by representatives
of the news media of a person in custody unless, in writing, he
requests or consents to an interview after being adequately informed
of his right to consult with counsel and of his right to refuse to
grant an interview.
(c) A regulation providing:
From the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant, or the
filing of any complaint, information, or indictment in any criminal
matter, until the completion of trial or disposition without trial,
no law enforcement officer within this agency shall release or
authorize the release of any extrajudicial statement for dissemination by any means of public communication, relating to that matter
and concerning:
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments,
or other charges of crime), or the character or reputation of
the accused, except that the officer may make a factual statement of the accused's name, age, residence, occupation, and
family status, and if the accused has not been apprehended,
may release any information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present;
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(2) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or
statement given by the accused, or the refusal or failure of
the accused to make any statement, except that the officer
may announce without further comment that the accused
denies the charges made against him;
(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or the
accused's refusal or failure to submit to an examination or
test;
(4) The identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses, except that the officer may announce the identity of
the victim if the announcement is not otherwise prohibited
by law;
(5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged
or a lesser offense;
(6) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence or as
to the merits of the case or the evidence in the case.
It shall be appropriate during this period for a law enforcement
officer:
(1) to announce the fact and cirmustances of arrest, including
the time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of
weapons;
(2) to announce the identity of the investigating and arresting officer or agency and the length of the investigation;
(3) to make an announcement, at the time of seizure of any
physical evidence other than a confession, admission, or statement, which is limited to a description of the evidence seized;
(4) to disclose the nature, substance, or text of the charge,
including a brief description of the offense charged;
(5) to quote from or refer without comment to public records
of the court in the case;
(6) to announce the scheduling or result of any stage in the
judicial process;
(7) to request assistance in obtaining evidence.
Nothing in this rule precludes any law enforcement officer
from replying to charges of misconduct that are publicly made
against him, precludes any law enforcement officer from participating in any legislative, administrative, or investigative hearing,
or supersedes any more restrictive rule governing the release of
information concerning juvenile or other offenders.
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(d) A regulation providing for the enforcement of the foregoing
by the imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions.

2.2 RULE OF COURT OR LEGISLATION RELATING TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES.

It is recommended that if within a reasonable time a law
enforcement agency in any jurisdiction fails to adopt and adhere
to the substance of the regulation recommended in section 2.1 (c),
as it relates to both proper and improper disclosures, the regulation
be made effective with respect to that agency by rule of court or
by legislative action, with appropriate sanctions for violation.
2.3 RULE OF COURT RELATING TO DIscLosUREs BY JUDICIAL EMPLOYs.
It is recommended that a rule of court be adopted in each
jurisdiction prohibiting any judicial employee from disclosing, to
any unauthorized person, information relating to a pending criminal
case that is not part of the public records of the court and that may
tend to interfere with the right of the people or of the defendant to
a fair trial. Particular reference should be made in this rule to the
nature and result of any argument or hearing held in chambers or
otherwise outside the presence of the public and not yet available
to the public under the standards in section 3.1 and section 3.5 (d)
of these recommendations. Appropriate discipline, including proceedings for contempt, should be provided for infractions of this rule.
2.4

RECONMENDATIONS RELATING TO JUDGES.

It is recommended that, with respect to pending criminal cases,
judges should refrain from any conduct or the making of any
statements that may tend to interfere with the right of the people
or of the defendant to a fair trial.
PART III. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
CONDUCT OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES
3.1

PRETIAL HEARINGS.

It is recommended that the following rule be adopted in each
jurisdiction by the appropriate court:
Motion to exclude public from all or part of pretrial hearing.
In any preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pretrial, hearing in a criminal case, including a motion to suppress evidence,
the defendant may move that all or part of the hearing be held
in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, including representa-
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tives of the news media, on the ground that dissemination of
evidence or argument adduced at the hearing may disclose matters
that will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and is therefore
likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
The motion shall be granted unless the presiding officer determines
that there is no substantial likelihood of such interference. With
the consent of the defendant, the presiding officer may take such
action on his own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecution.
Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial hearing is held
in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, a complete record of
the proceedings shall be kept and shall be made available to the
public following the completion of trial or disposition of the case
without trial. Nothing in this rule is intended to interfere with the
power of the presiding officer in any pretrial hearing to caution
those present that dissemination of certain information by any
means of public communication may jeopardize the right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury.
3.2

CHANGE OF VENUE OR CONTINUANCE.

It is recommended that the following standards be adopted in
each jurisdiction to govern the consideration and disposition of
a motion in a criminal case for change of venue or continuance
based on a claim of threatened interference with the right to a
fair trial.
(a) Who may request.
Except as federal or state constitutional provisions otherwise
require, a change of venue or continuance may be granted on
motion of either the prosecution or the defense.
(b) Methods of proof.
In addition to the testimony or affidavits of individuals in the
community, which shall not be required as a condition of the
granting of a motion for change of venue or continuance, qualified
public opinion surveys shall be admissible as well as other materials
having probative value.
(c) Standards for granting motion.
A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted
whenever it is determined that because of the dissemination of
potentially prejudicial material, there is a reasonable likelihood
that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. This
determination may be based on such evidence as qualified public
opinion surveys or open testimony offered by individuals, or on the
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court's own evaluation of the nature, frequency, and timing of the
material involved. A showing of actual prejudice shall not be
required.
(d) Same; time of disposition.
If a motion for change of venue or continuance is made prior
to the impaneling of the jury, the motion shall be disposed of
before impaneling. If such a motion is permitted to be made, or
if reconsideration or review of a prior denial is sought, after the
jury has been selected, the fact that a jury satisfying prevailing
standards of acceptability has been selected shall not be controlling
if the record shows that the criterion for the granting of relief set
forth in subsection (c) has been met.
(e) Limitations; waiver.
It shall not be a ground for denial of a change of venue that
one such change has already been granted. The claim that the
venue should have been changed or a continuance granted shall
not be considered to have been waived by the waiver of the right
to trial by jury or by the failure to exercise all available peremptory
challenges.
3.3

WAIVER OF JuRY.

In those jurisdictions in which the defendant does not have
an absolute right to waive a jury in a criminal case, it is recommended that the defendant be permitted to waive whenever it is
determined that (1) the waiver has been knowingly and voluntarily
made and (2) there is reason to believe that, as a result of the
dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is
required to increase the likelihood of a fair trial.
3.4

SELECTmG THE JURY.

It is recommended that the following standards be adopted
in each jurisdiction to govern the selection of a jury in those
criminal cases in which questions on possible prejudice are raised.
(a) Method of examination.
Whenever there is believed to be a significant possibility that
individual talesmen will be ineligible to serve because of exposure
to potentially prejudicial material, the examination of each juror
with respect to his exposure shall take place outside the presence
of other chosen and prospective jurors. An accurate record of this
examination shall be kept, by court reporter or tape recording
whenever possible. The questioning shall be conducted for the
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purpose of determining what the prospective juror has read and
heard about the case and how his exposure has affected his attitude
towards the trial, not to convince him that he would be derelict in
his duty if he could not cast aside any preconceptions he might have.
(b) Standard of acceptability.
Both the degree of exposure and the prospective juror's testimony as to his state of mind are relevant to the determination of
acceptability. A prospective juror who states that he will be unable
to overcome his preconceptions shall be subject to challenge for
cause no matter how slight his exposure. If he has seen or heard
and remembers information that will be developed in the course
of trial, or that may be inadmissible but is not so prejudicial as to
create a substantial risk that his judgment will be affected, his
acceptability shall turn on whether his testimony as to impartiality
is believed. If he admits to having formed an opinion, he shall be
subject to challenge for cause unless the examination shows unequivocally that he can be impartial. A prospective juror who has
been exposed to and remembers reports of highly significant information, such as the existence or contents of a confession, or other
incriminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence, or substantial amounts of inflammatory material, shall be subject to
challenge for cause without regard to his testimony as to his state
of mind.
(c)

Source of the panel.

Whenever it is determined that potentially prejudicial news
coverage of a given criminal matter has been intense and has been
concentrated primarily in a given locality in a state (or federal
district), the court shall have authority to draw jurors from other
localities in that state (or district).
3.5

CoNDucT OF =H TRIAL.

It is recommended that the following standards be adopted in
each jurisdiction to govern the conduct of a criminal trial when
problems relating to the dissemination of potentially prejudicial
material are raised.
(a) Use of the courtroom.
Whenever appropriate in view of the notoriety of the case or
the number or conduct of news media representatives present at
any judicial proceeding, the court shall ensure the preservation
of decorum by instructing those representatives and others as to
the permissible use of the courtroom and other facilities of the
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court, the assignment of seats to news media representatives on
an equitable basis, and other matters that may affect the conduct
of the proceeding.
(b) Sequestration of jury.
Either party shall be permitted to move for sequestration of
the jury at the beginning of trial or at any time during the course
of the trial, and, in appropriate circumstances, the court shall order
sequestration on its own motion. Sequestration shall be ordered if
it is determined that the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of
such a nature that, in the absence of sequestration, highly prejudicial
matters are likely to come to the attention of the jurors. Whenever
sequestration is ordered, the court in advising the jury of the
decision shall not disclose which party requested sequestration.
(c) Cautioning parties, witnesses, jurors, and judicial employees;
insulating witnesses.
Whenever appropriate in light of the issues in the case or the
notoriety of the case, the court shall instruct parties, witnesses,
jurors, and employees and officers of the court not to make extrajudicial statements, relating to the case or the issues in the case,
for dissemination by any means of public communication during
the course of the trial. The court may also order sequestration of
witnesses, prior to their appearance,- when it appears likely that in
the absence of sequestration they will be exposed to extrajudicial
reports that may influence their testimony.
(d) Exclusion of the public from hearings or arguments outside
the presence of the jury.
If the jury is not sequestered, the defendant shall be permitted
to move that the public, including representatives of the news
media, be excluded from any portion of the trial that takes place
outside the presence of the jury on the ground that dissemination
of evidence or argument adduced at the hearing is likely to interfere
with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The
motion shall be granted unless it is determined that there is no
substantial likelihood of such interference. With the consent of the
defendant, the court may take such action on its own motion or
at the suggestion of the prosecution. Whenever such action is taken,
a complete record of the proceedings from which the public has been
excluded shall be kept and shall be made available to the public
following the completion of the trial. Nothing in this recommendation is intended to interfere with the power of the court, in connection with any hearing held outside the presence of the jury, to
caution those present that dissemination of specified information by
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any means of public communication, prior to the rendering of the
verdict, may jeopardize the right to fair trial by an impartial jury.
(e) Cautioning jurors.
In any case that appears to be of significant public interest,
an admonition in substantially the following form shall be given
before the end of the first day if the jury is not sequestered.
During the time you serve on this jury, there may appear in
the newspapers or on radio or television reports concerning
this case, and you may be tempted to read, listen to, or watch
them. Please do not do so. Due process of law requires that
the evidence to be considered by you in reaching your verdict
meet certain standards-for example, a witness may testify
about events he himself has seen or heard but not about
matters of which he was told by others. Also, witnesses must
be sworn to tell the truth and must be subject to cross-examination. News reports about the case are not subject to these
standards, and if you read, listen to, or watch these reports,
you may be exposed to misleading or inaccurate information
which unduly favors one side and to which the other side is
unable to respond. In fairness to both sides, therefore, it is
essential that you comply with this instruction.
If the process of selecting a jury is a lengthy one, such admonition
shall also be given to each juror as he is selected. At the end of each
subsequent day of the trial, and at other recess periods if the court
deems necessary, an admonition in substantially the following form
shall be given:
For the reasons stated earlier in the trial, I must remind you
not to read, listen to, or watch any news reports concerning
this case while you are serving on this jury.
(f) Questioning jurors about exposure to potentially prejudicial
material in the course of the trial; standard for excusing a juror.
If it is determined that material disseminated during the trial
goes beyond the record on which the case is to be submitted to the
jury and raises serious questions of possible prejudice, the court
may on its own motion or shall on motion of either party question
each juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure
to that material. The examination shall take place in the presence
of counsel, and an accurate record of the examination shall be kept.
The standard for excusing a juror who is challenged on the basis
of such exposure shall be the same as the standard of acceptability
recommended in section 3.4 (b), above, except that a juror who has
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seen or heard reports of potentially prejudicial material shall be
excused if reference to the material in question at the trial itself
would have required a mistrial to be declared.
3.6

SETTING ASIDE THE VERDICT.

It is recommended that, on motion of the defendant, a verdict
of guilty in any criminal case be set aside and a new trial granted
whenever, on the basis of competent evidence, the court finds a
substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was
influenced by exposure to an extrajudicial communication of any
matter relating to the defendant or to the case itself that was not
part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury.
Nothing in this recommendation is intended to affect the rule in any
jurisdiction as to whether and in what circumstances a juror may
impeach his own verdict or as to what other evidence is competent
for that purpose.

PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
EXERCISE OF THE CONTEMPT POWER

4.1

LIITED USE OF THE CONTEMPT POWER.

It is recommended that the contempt power should be used
only with considerable caution but should be exercised under the
following circumstances:
(a) Against a person who, knowing that a criminal trial by jury
is in progress or that a jury is being selected for such a trial:
(i) disseminates by any means of public communication
an extrajudicial statement relating to the defendant or to the
issues in the case that goes beyond the public record of the court
in the case, that is wilfully designed by that person to affect
the outcome of the trial, and that seriously threatens to have
such an effect; or
(ii) makes such a statement intending that it be disseminated
by any means of public communication.
(b) Against a person who knowingly violates a valid judicial
order not to disseminate, until completion of the trial or disposition without trial, specified information referred to in the
course of a judicial hearing closed pursuant to sections 3.1 or
3.5 (d) of these recommendations.

